家族企業抑或非家族企業代理人與穩健性的關係分析之研究

Research on the Relationship between Family Business Agent or Non-Family Business Agent and Conservatism

陳俊宏(Jyun-Hong Chen) ； 張彥霏(Yan-Fei Zhang) ； 邱采縈(Cai-Ying Ciou) ； 蘇靖雅(Jing-Ya Su) ； 黃馨儀(Sin-Yi Huang) ； 池昱君(Yu-Jyun Chih)

《會計與公司治理》 14卷1期 (2019/06) Pp. 1-21

摘要

本研究旨在探討家族企業代理人或非家族企業代理人的選擇，並藉由穩健性的關係，深入研究代理問題之均衡，並透過代理人的薪資結構及其責任加以評估，分析家族企業代理人與非家族企業所產生的經營績效之比較。在本研究的六項均衡分析發現：（1）當績效薪資率在家族企業高於非家族企業時，則家族企業代理人的盈餘績效高於非家族企業，共有2項均衡；另外，家族企業代理人的盈餘績效不一定高於非家族企業，共有4項均衡。（2）當績效薪資率在家族企業低於非家族企業時，則家族企業代理人的盈餘績效不一定高於非家族企業，共有6項均衡。（3）當績效薪資率在家族企業等於非家族企業時，則家族企業代理人的盈餘績效高於非家族企業，共有3項均衡；另外，家族企業代理人的盈餘績效不一定高於非家族企業，共有3項均衡。（4）當代理人的聲譽率大於績效薪資率時，則會計穩健為其優勢策略；反之，則會計積極為其優勢策略。

關鍵字

家族企業 ； 會計穩健性 ； 代理問題 ； 績效薪資

並列摘要

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between family businesses and conservatism, and to analyze in depth the equilibrium of agency problem. This study was evaluated by the agent's salary structure and agent's responsibilities, and thorough analysis to understand the comparison of the operating performance of family business agents and non-family business. The research results obtained under the six different equilibriums are found as follows: (1)When the agent's performance pay rate of family businesses is greater than that of the non-family businesses, the family business has a higher surplus than the nonfamily business in the two equilibriums; the surplus of the family business may not be higher than that of the non-family business in the four equilibriums.(2)When the agent's performance pay rate of family businesses is smaller than that of the non-family businesses, the surplus of the family business may not be higher than that of the non-family business in the six equilibriums.(3)When the agent's performance pay rate of family businesses is equal to that of the non-family businesses, the family business has a higher surplus than the nonfamily business in the three equilibriums; the surplus of the family business may not be higher than that of the non-family business in the other three equilibriums.(4)If the responsible reputation rate is greater than the agent's performance salary rate, then accounting conservatism is the dominant strategy; conversely, accounting enthusiasm is the dominant strategy.

並列關鍵字

Family business ； Accounting conservatism ； Agency problem ； Performance salary

參考文獻

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Kuo, T. L., and C. Y. Wang. 2017. How does corporate governance affect the performance of family businesses? A long-term longitudinal analysis. Journal of Accounting Review64: 61-111.

LaFond, W., and R. L. Watts. 2008. The information role of conservatism. The Accounting Review 83(2): 447-478.