主體對於認識對象所形成的信念並不必然符合於事實而為真,本文以符合於事實的判斷為知識。我們發現荀子業已指出不論是從知覺、名實關係或幻覺所產生的信念都有出錯的可能,是而對於信念的求真與除錯變成為知識理論中不可或缺的要求。荀子認為當主體處於「虛壹而靜」的認識狀態下,其所形成的信念由於排除了認識之蔽塞,不會有出錯的可能,是而此信念必然符合於事實而可為知識。本文稱「虛壹而靜」的要求為知識的倫理規範。此外,荀子亦認為藉由「辨合、符驗」與「起而可設,張而可施行」等兩種方式,可以檢證信念是否合於客觀事實。是之為真而為知識,反之則否。本文以此為荀子對於知識的檢證方式。
Belief is not always in line with fact. Knowledge is generated only when belief is consistent with fact. Xunzi indicates that one’s belief originating from perception, illusion, and name-substance relationship may deviate from the fact, so a method used to justify the belief is necessary. He argues that the belief-fact consistency can only appear under the hsü-yi-ching (虛壹而靜) situation because the impediment of knowing no longer exists. This article treats hsü-yi-ching as an ethical standard of knowledge. In addition, Xunzi argues that the following two methods can be used to examine whether a belief-fact gap exists. The first one is pien-ho and fu-yen (辨合、符驗). The second one is feasibility. More precisely, a match of belief and fact appears when ”those who sit and talk can prove that their speech is doable” (坐而言之,起而可設張而可施行). The author deems these two methods as the ”justification of knowledge.”