政治制度對我國財政赤字的影響

The Influence of Political Institutions on Taiwan's Budget Deficits

葉嘉楠(Chia-Nan Yeh)

《中華人文社會學報》 2期 (2005/03) Pp. 84-110

摘要

我國近年來財政赤字惡化快速，93年度中央政府累計債務餘額高達三點四兆，占GDP的33%，平均每位國民負債十七萬元。因此，赤字問題已成為我國政府施政的最重要項目之一。本研究採取政府能力的一般模型(general model of government capabilities)來研究政治制度對我國財政赤字的影響。政府能力的一般模型主張政治制度形塑了決策制定與執行之過程，進而影響了政府的效能。
我國經過多次修憲，原本目標是朝向法國第五共和憲法，但目前我國憲法設計已與法國大異其趣，而朝向內閣制的機率也不大，較可能的方向是維持現狀或朝向總統制修改。
在政權型態與選舉制度上，目前的單記非讓渡投票法配合比例代表制容許多黨的出現，因此導致政黨輪替以來沒有政黨在立院能過半，造成政權不穩定、內閣平均壽命過短、與分立政府的出現，政府政策常因反對黨阻撓而出現僵局，不利於財政赤字的控制。我國自第七屆起立委席次將減為一百一十三席並採單一選區兩票制。如果採取單一選區兩票制的並立制將有助於形成穩定的政治聯盟，對政府財政赤字的控制將較為有利。
在影響政府能力的第三層因素中，大法官會議的角色已經愈來愈重要，尤其當執政當局在國會無法掌握過半席次的時候。至於聯邦制因台灣地小人稠，所以沒有存在的可能性，但地方權力的提昇則是不可逆轉的潮流。這些因素不見得會增加財政赤字，但對財政赤字的控制都無任何幫助。
在預算制度方面，我國還有許多進步的空間。除了缺乏平衡預算的規定及相關懲處之外，政治人物及政府當局藐視預算法相關規定及明顯違法一事尤其嚴重。因此，訂定財政紀律法、建立明確平衡預算時間表、杜絕政客隨便開支票減稅、及增稅才是解決我國龐大債務的當務之急。

關鍵字

預算 ； 赤字 ； 總統制與內閣制 ； 政權型態 ； 選舉制度 ； 聯邦制與單一制 ； 財政紀律

並列摘要

Recently, the problem of Taiwan's budget deficits deteriorated rapidly. In 2004, the accumulated debt in Taiwan's central government climbed up to 3, 400 billions, accounted for 33% GDP, represented every citizen bear 170 thousand of national debt. Therefore, budget deficits have become one of the serious problems faced by the authorities. In this study we use the general model of government capacities to analyze the influence of political institutions on Taiwan's budget deficits. General model of government capacities asserted that political institutions shape the decision-making and process of implementation, and then affect the government effectiveness.
Taiwan had experienced six times of Constitution Amendment since president Li's era. The original benchmark was the model of French Fifth Republic, but current Taiwan's constitutional design is far from French style and possible constitution orientation will be the presidential system.
In regime type and electoral system, current single nontransferable vote with proportional representation system allows the existence of multiple parties and which result in no single party controlling the legislature, unstable regimes, divided government, and fiscal deficits. Taiwan will adopt single-member district with two votes system from seventh legislative election. If the single-member district with separated two-vote system is adopted, it will cause more stable regime and be conducive to control budget deficits.
In the third tier of factors, the Supreme Court plays an more and more vital role, especially when no party controls the legislature. Federalism will not fit in Taiwan's status quo, but the increasing local power is irreversible. These factors may not cause deficits but is not good for controlling budget deficits.
In budget institutions, Taiwan still needs balanced budget law and related punishment article. In addition, the biggest problem in Taiwan's fiscal deficits is that politicians violated related budget laws. Therefore, the priorities of controlling budget deficits will be to create fiscal discipline law, establish specific timetable of balanced budget, prevent politicians' promise to reduce taxes, and raise taxes.

並列關鍵字

Budget ； Deficit ； Presidential and Cabinet System ； Regime Type ； Electoral System ； Federalism and Unitary System ； Fiscal Discipline