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China and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Verification of a "Responsible Stakeholder"

並列摘要


China plays an important political and economic role that has a considerable impact on regions throughout the world, but especially in East Asia. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past ”one nation pacifism,” and has begun to actively participate in international affairs under the twin frameworks of the ”U.S.-Japan alliance” and the UN in order to fulfill its dream of becoming a ”political great power.” Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in addressing regional issues. On October 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. This step has increased tensions in the region of East Asia and has also disturbed relations among regional powers. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in Northeast Asia, to intervene in North Korea, hoping to resolve the problem by means of multilateral agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan and establish a ”military strategic partnership,” or will it expose the radical division separating the two countries? Using the approach of ”double regulations,” this paper will analyze the interaction between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis. ”Double regulations” means the U.S. ”regulates” other concerned great powers to prevent them from overtaking the U.S. and gain regional dominance, while at the same time it is attempting to ”regulate” North Korea to defuse the ”Korea Peninsula crisis.” By examining the interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis, we can clarify the two countries' regional strategic thinking beyond their competition and cooperation in the spheres of politics, security, and economics; therefore, whether or not China' doings in the North Korea nuclear crisis meet the expectations of the U.S. as a ”responsible stakeholder” can be examined from the above interactions.

參考文獻


Japan Defense Agent Website
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