再就業工資談判的博弈分析

The Analysis of Wages-negotiation in the Course of Re-employment by Game Theory

王雪(Xue Wang) ； 呂洪渠(Hong-Qu Lv)

《管理科學與統計決策》 4卷2期 (2007/06) Pp. 20-26

https://doi.org/10.6704/JMSSD.2007.4.2.20

摘要

失業者再就業時將與企業就工資問題進行談判，這實際上是一個討價還價的過程，我們借助納什討價還價解建立了一個博弈模型，刻畫了存在失業利益條件下工人和企業之間的工資議價行為。結論是：失業利益將加強工人的工資要價能力，降低工人求職的努力程度，過高的失業利益甚至導致工人提前結束談判，而過低的失業利益導致工人在各階段的工資要價都較低；由於資訊不對稱，企業可以憑藉資訊優勢對工人的要價進行壓價。理論上，存在最優的失業保障。

關鍵字

博弈論 ； 工資談判 ； 失業保 ； 再就業

並列摘要

When the time of re-employment comes, the unemployed would negotiate with the enterprise for the problem of wage. In fact, this is a bargaining process. With the help of Nash Equilibrium, we managed to depict the behavior of negotiating between the worker and the enterprise when the benefit of unemployment exits. The conclusion we drew is that the benefit of unemployment will enhance the jobless' ability of bargaining and it will reduce their degree of striving for jobs as well. If there is enough benefit, the negotiation may be terminated ahead of time. On the contrary, a low-level benefit may lead to low-level wages in every stage; as a result of the dissymmetrical information, the enterprise may demand a lower wage to the worker by their advantage of information. Theoretically speaking, there must be an optimum unemployment insurance level.

並列關鍵字

Game Theory ； Salary Negotiation ； Unemployment Insurance ； Re-employment

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