論戴震之道德哲學

On Dai Zhen's Ethical Philosophy

鄧秀梅(Hsiu-Mei Teng)

《高應科大人文社會科學學報》 2卷 (2005/07) Pp. 33-52

https://doi.org/10.29888/KUASJHSS.200507.0003

摘要

道德哲學為中國哲學十分重要的一門學問，尤以宋明理學為其中之佼佼者。而理學之論道德，大率以「心即性，性即理」為踐德之根據，所云之心、性乃超越氣質之上的一種義理之性，與心理情緒之心，或自然性好之性大相逕庭。如此界定，便已說明人之道德行為不能取氣質、性好等因素來解析，更不能將此類因素作為德行的準則。固然，落實這種理論在現實社會上，是可轉化風俗，砥礪氣節，然不可免的，理學之末流亦有拘錮人性的弊病，針對此弊病起而反對宋明理學家之學者，便一一出現，清朝時期的戴震就是其中一位。戴震之反理學，不僅反其流弊，甚且反對理學家對道德之源的界定，他是徹頭徹尾地對前人所說之道德理論提出質疑與批評。依據他的講法，道德不能委託於心、性、天，而是要植根於客觀之自然，是以有「理在事中，不具於心內」的說法。至於道德行為之共通準則，便是「以我之情絜人之情」，如此便能避免截理欲為二，動不動便以理桎梏人，甚而以理殺人。本文主要針對戴震的學說，進行分析評論，考察戴震所言是否真貼切於道德原理，所有他批評理學家之言果真合情合理？這些乃是本文討論的重心。

關鍵字

理在事中 ； 以情絜情 ； 性之欲 ； 知覺

並列摘要

The moral philosophy is a very important knowledge in Chinese philosophy, and the Song and Ming Dynasties are the most outstanding in history. The Confucian school of idealists discusses the morals in light of the mind, nature and tian as the behavior basis, but these concepts are not possessed in human nature. As regards this viewpoint, some people are extremely puzzled, and even discontented Qing Dynasty's Dai Chen could be the representative Confucian. Dai Chen thought the moral root cannot put on the mind, nature, and tian, but should take root in the objective nature, thus he had the way of saying ”the principle in the matter, not in the mind”. The common principle of moral behavior is ”sympathizes others' sentiment by the sentiment”, so it can avoid cutting off desires, and keeping off principles to shackle, even to kill easily.Dai Chen opposed Confucianism's prevalent abuse; and he indignantly wrote books to publish his own idea. But is Dai Chen's theory really an appropriate moral principle? Is his criticism really fair? Many doubtful points exist. This article carries on the analysis discussion based on doubtful points, hoping to make more just comment.

並列關鍵字

the principle in the matter ； sympathizes others' sentiment by the sentiment ； the desires of nature ； perceptions