This essay analyzes the military coup that occurred in Thailand on September 19, 2006. It considers what led to this event in a country many considered as having made substantial progress in consolidating its democracy. The main argument focuses on the lack of a mass political movement or group that is well-organized, well-financed, and motivated enough to mount a successful, sustained challenge to the key power holders in Thailand: high-level government politicians, the Thai owners or major Thai shareholders of large domestic corporations, and high-ranking military leaders. The lack of a strong and varied interest group structure in Thailand is a critical fissure in the country's political system. Interest group weaknesses have four characteristics: (1) the imbalance of power between the state and interest groups remains highly skewed toward the government; (2) much of the interest group community lacks enough autonomy from the state to effectively promote political reforms; (3) interest groups are fragmented in ways that create major obstacles to forming national coalitions or political parties that support democratization; and (4) the proclivities of Thai history favor a strong monarchy and there is no colonial legacy. These weaknesses contribute substantially to the tenuousness of Thai democracy and leave the political system open to dominance by such powerful players.