The ”Color Revolutions” in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) used extra- parliamentary means to challenge the results of fraudulent elections and to bring about the end of semi-authoritarian rule in the two countries. Corruption played an important role in prompting these events and became one of the major grievances of the forces of change in the two countries. Currently, although various problems of democratic governance remain in both countries, no return to the times of Shevardnadze and Kuchma is possible. However, according to the Freedom House/Nations in Transit (NiT) reports, corruption continues to be rampant in Ukraine, while it appears to be tamed in Georgia. These developments present some interesting puzzles about the links between corruption and democratization and democracy and corruption. The purpose of this essay is two-fold. First, it analyzes the role of corruption and other rent-seeking behavior for the fall of the Shevardnadze and Kuchma regimes in 2003 and 2004, respectively. Second, it examines the trends in corruption in Georgia and Ukraine since then, and seeks an explanation for these differential outcomes in the nature of party development and party competition in the two countries.