芬蘭國會選制下的策略性投票

Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation: The Case of Finland

李憲榮(Shane Lee)

《台灣國際研究季刊》 6卷1期 (2010/03) Pp. 75-94

摘要

國內對歐洲國家的政治探討較爲缺乏，本文目的在探討芬蘭的政黨體制和其選舉制度。芬蘭採用比例代表制，其特色在於複數選區和複數席位，席位以頓特公式計算各個選區（而非全國）的席位。除政黨外，「選民協會」也可連署推出候選人。芬蘭有三個實力各約20-30%的大黨，而無一個獨大的政黨，而且小黨林立，內閣都是由數個政黨（或聯盟）組成。一般而言，在比例代表制下，選民要做策略性投票所需要的資訊和知識較多，所以比較困難，但是還是有策略性投票的現象。芬蘭因分區選舉，其情況更爲複雜。由於資料的缺乏和搜集的困難，本文僅能做初步探討，希望拋磚引玉。

關鍵字

政黨體制 ； 比例代表制 ； 複數選區 ； 選舉聯盟 ； 策略性投票

並列摘要

In Taiwan there is a shortage of studies on the politics of European countries. The purpose of this paper is to study Finland's political party system and its electoral system. Finland uses Proportional Representation (PR) system with at least two special features, namely multi-districts with various magnitudes and seats are distributed on the basis of a district (rather than nationally). Candidates may be nominated by political parties and by voters' associations. There is not a single dominant political party. There are three larger parties each with 20-30% of votes and a number of smaller parties. The government is normally formed by several parties or alliances. In general, under the PR system, voters need a lot more information and knowledge to practice ”strategic voting”. However, strategic voting does exist under PR. In the case of Finland, strategic voting is even more difficult because of its multi-district system. Due to lack of information and difficulty in collecting data, this paper only serves as a preliminary study on this subject in hope that more studies are forthcoming.

並列關鍵字

party system ； proportional representation ； multi-district ； electoral alliance ； strategic voting

參考文獻

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