以馬可夫鏈探討代表性納稅人之租稅行為

Analysis of taxpayers' behavior by taking Markov chain

王有康(Yu kun Wang)

《東亞論壇》 501期 (2018/09) Pp. 21-34

摘要

OECD與歐洲委員會於2010年修訂《多邊稅收徵管互助公約》鼓勵世界各國共同簽訂以建立國際稅收徵管之合作原則與標準以來，目前已有100多個國家簽署，面對全球反避稅查稅趨勢，未來企業避稅之隱匿成本將提高。惟囿於查稅人力經費等限制，各國稅捐機關實際上無法對所有納稅人的匿報資料進行全面清查；本文發現馬可夫鏈係指在已知當前與過去狀態下，未來轉換機率僅依賴當前狀態；與過去事件無直接關係。由於代表性納稅人選擇誠實繳稅抑或逃漏稅，係當事人當期之內生決策變數，約當馬可夫鏈模型，爰此，本文主要以馬可夫鏈模型，計算核課期間內逃稅人數以及稅基侵蝕金額大小。

關鍵字

馬可夫鏈 ； 轉換機率 ； 稅基侵蝕 ； 核課期間 ； 隱匿成本

並列摘要

Some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe, but many others will not. Tax authorities shall punish the tax evaders found to have violated the tax laws. OECD and the European Commission in 2010 to amend the ＂multilateral tax collection and mutual assistance Convention＂ to encourage countries around the world signed to establish international tax collection and standards of cooperation. But limited to inspection funds and manpower constraints, tax authorities can not check whether the taxpayer is honest to declare the real income. So far, there seem no literature to estimate the proportion of taxpayers in a country who will evade taxes. In this paper, we try to establish the model of taxpayers' possible behavior by Markov chain and calculate the proportion of taxpayers in a country within a certain period will choose to pay the tax honestly or choose tax evasion. So as to serve as a reference for a government to predict the extent of tax erosion.

並列關鍵字

Markov chain ； transition probability ； tax evasion ； assessment period ； concealment cost

參考文獻

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