本研究探討家族企業特性及其股權偏離程度對負債水準之影響。 家族企業考量自身利益與多角化不足的風險會藉由負債水準的改變降低潛在風險及剝削少數股東,本研究考量內生性問題,利用三階段最小平方法檢測家族企業與非家族企業的負債水準是否有差異;此外,臺灣金字塔結構與交叉持股相當普遍,加重家族企業股權偏離嚴重性,有別於以往文獻,考量家族特性後,推論家族企業股權偏離程度與負債水準可能具有非線性關係。 實證結果發現,家族企業相對於非家族企業傾向採用高舉債來轉嫁風險給債權人及增加可剝削資源;再者,家族企業股權偏離程度與負債水準具有先降後升的非線性關係;最後,家族成員雖掌握董事會多數席次,但外部董事仍能發揮監督能力。
This paper examines how family businesses' characteristics and deviation from one-share-one-vote affect their financial leverage. Family businesses are a special ownership structure in Taiwan. Considering family members' own benefits and under-diversified risk, family businesses have incentives to adjust their financial leverage for reducing potential risk and expropriating minority shareholders. We use three stages least squares method to solve the endogeneity problem and investigate whether financial leverage of family businesses are different from that of non-family businesses. Moreover, we consider the unique characteristics of family businesses and suggest that there may be non-linear relationship between deviation and financial leverage. The results support the hypothesis that family businesses tend to use more debt for reducing the potential risk and maintaining their private control benefits. Moreover, there is a U-shape non-linear relationship between deviation and financial leverage for family businesses. Finally, although most directors of family businesses are family members, outside directors still can mitigate the wealth expropriation behavior in family businesses.