慾望作為動態人學的整合：P. Tillich神學的慾望書寫

慾望在傳統神學的論述中，向來都處在於一個被隔離的特殊性之中，特別是從Augustine繼承早期教父傳統將慾望視為罪惡的淵藪開始，慾望幾乎失去其存在任何神聖理據。本文嘗試籍由Tillich神學的本體論（ontology）特色，將其人學中關於慾望的核心論述進行闡述。首先，指出Tillich對墮落著名的再定義「從本質到存在之轉移」，基本上隱含了極為清楚的慾望痕跡，並以三組極性的本體論架構：「個別化與參與」（Individualisation and Participation）、「動力與形式」（Dynamics and Form）與「自由與命運」（Freedom and Destiny），勾勒出Tillich人學中慾望作為存有普遍性的動力來源；緊接著進一步從Tillich的愛觀出發，呈顯慾望展現的諸形式：epithymia、eros、agape、philia，以確證慾望與人的自我實踐之間有著絕對的不可分割性；最後，則是以Tillich備受爭議的慾望人生作結，期望應證慾望作為自我實踐之動力的行文基調。

關鍵字

本體論；慾望；疏離；人學

並列摘要

Traditional theological discourse has generally treated desire as a particularly isolated concept that deserves no positive attention. This is especially the case after St. Augustine had interpreted desire, following the tradition of the church fathers, as a cesspool of human's iniquity. Based on Tillich's onto logy, this article is an attempt to elaborate on the issue of desire derived particularly from his anthropology: firstly, it shows how Tillich's celebrated re-definition of human's fall, namely ”the transition form essence to existence”, implies a very clear notion of desire. It then argues, through three ontological frameworks that include Individualisation and Participation, Dyamics and Form, and Freedom and Destiny, how desire has been the common ground of the universality of being in Tillich's anthropology. It moves on to describe the various expressions of desire based on Tillich's perspective of love, which include epithymia, eros, agape, and philia, and argues that desire is ultimately inseparable from human's self actualization. It concludes, lastly, with Tillich's disputable erotic life which was filled with unbounded desire, seeking to prove how desire can be the motivation (foundation) of self actualization.