多重代理問題與外部董事獨立性之審計研究

Audit in Multiple Principle-Agent and Independence of Outside Director

陳俊宏(Chun-Hung Chen) ； 張舒綺(Shu-Chi Chang) ； 林家緯(Chia-Wei Lin)

《會計審計論叢》 6卷1期 (2016/06) Pp. 87-108

摘要

有鑑於董事會監督機制與資訊透明度為有效減緩代理問題之衡量指標，藉此本文探討企業在設置外部董事會機制下，第一：是否會降低代理問題的可能性，第二：對於內部董事從事掏空資產的行為下，外部董事是否善盡職責、執行監督之理論分析。本研究發現：一、不具獨立性之外部董事僅擁有給予主理人報酬的控制權數，因此，外部董事若要避免主理人有自利動機從事掏空資產行為，則將會設計誘因契約亦或激勵性報酬以間接控制主理人，使主理人與股東利益一致。二、主理人在設置代理人的底薪制度時，存在著四種不同結果。三、在具有獨立性外部董事的監督下，內部董事會事先衡量資產權益比重及被外部董事查核發現受到懲罰之因素，以決定是否進行掏空資產。四、在外部董事嚴謹的監督下，內部董事可能因自利動機而與代理人產生利益勾結，但內部董事基於法律的制裁，其會依據與代理人勾結前和勾結後，被外部董事查核發現機率的大小而進行掏空資產。

關鍵字

代理問題 ； 外部董事 ； 獨立性 ； 賽局理論

並列摘要

The purpose of this study was to investigate board of directors reduce the agency problem that is an efficient measurement indicator. Therefore, this paper analyzes the model of the outside board of directors. First, it studies whether it will reduce the possibility of agency problem or not. Second, when inside directors may deplete assets, it studies whether outside directors will be able to fulfill their duties and perform supervision or not. The findings in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the non-independent outside directors only decide the weight of principal’s gain. Therefore, the outside directors prevent the principal from having self-serving motives in depletion of assets or agent problem; it will set the incentive contracts or incentive compensation scheme to control the principal indirectly, so that the interests of the owner and shareholders can converge. Second, when principal set the agent’s basic salary system, we have got four different results. Third, under the supervision of independent outside directors, inside directors decide whether they want to engage in depletion of assets, is determined by the proportion of assets in equity as well as the punishment of crime. Fourth, under the strict supervision of outside directors, inside directors may be due to selfish motives and thus generate interest in collusion with the agent. However inside directors also consider the factor of legal penalties, which would be based on the net interests of collusion as well as the unmasked probability.

並列關鍵字

Agent problem ； Board of directors ； Auditor independent ； Game Theory

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