公司治理評鑑機制對公司績效及關鍵查核事項揭露之影響：董事會政治連結的調節效果

The Influence of Corporate Governance Evaluation Mechanism on Firm Performance and Key Audit Matters Disclosure: The Moderating Effect of Board Political Connections

呂瑞芳(Jei-Fang Lew) ； 劉怡莉(I-Li Liu)

《會計審計論叢》 13卷1期 (2023/06) Pp. 123-171

摘要

董事會是企業內部公司治理機制的核心，過去文獻大多支持公司治理評鑑愈佳的企業，其公司績效及財務報導品質愈佳。當企業聘任政治人物擔任董事，看重其政商關係可以將關係資產轉化為經濟資產，為企業帶來外部資源。然而，透過政商關係，進而對公司產生影響而謀取私利，則非社會大眾所樂見。本研究探討政治連結董事對公司治理與公司績效及公司治理與會計師關鍵查核事項揭露之關聯性的調節效果。實證結果顯示政治連結董事會透過自身之政治連結謀取私利而破壞公司治理機制，將董事會形式化，因代理衝突而產生較高的代理成本，造成公司績效下降，對公司治理與公司績效之關聯性產生調節效果。政治連結董事亦會為隱藏透過政治關係而謀取的資源，干涉公司財務報導揭露方式，導致盈餘品質低落，會計師在評估審計風險下，認為必要提供較完整的資訊，因此關鍵查核事項的項目及字數愈多，對公司治理與關鍵查核事項揭露之關聯性產生調節效果。

關鍵字

董事會政治連結 ； 公司治理評鑑 ； 公司績效 ； 關鍵查核事項 ； 內生性

並列摘要

The board of directors is the core of the internal mechanism of corporate governance, most of the past literature supports that companies with better corporate governance evaluation have better firm performance and financial reporting quality. When a company appoints a politician as a director, valuing its political and business relationship can transform relationship assets into economic assets and bring external resources to the company. However, it is not acceptable to the public to seek personal gain through political and business relations, and then exert influence on the company. This study explores the moderating effect of politically connected directors on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, and between corporate governance and accountants' disclosure of key audit matters. The empirical results show that politically connected directors will use their own political connections to seek personal gain and destroy the corporate governance mechanism, formalize the board of directors, generate higher agency costs due to agency conflicts, cause firm performance to decline, and moderate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. In order to hide the resources obtained through political connections, they interfere with the way to disclose the company's financial reports, resulting in low earnings quality. Accountants consider it necessary to provide more complete information when assessing audit risks, so the more items and words of key audit matters, and then cause a moderating effect on the relationship between corporate governance and the disclosure of key audit matters.

並列關鍵字

Board political connection ； Corporate governance evaluation ； Firm performance ； Key audit matters ； Endogeneity

參考文獻

朱雲漢，1995，如何面對民主時代政商關係的挑戰，國家政策雙週刊，103: 12-14。(Chu, Yun-Han. 1995. How to face the challenges of business-government relations in the democratic ear. National Policy Dynamic Analysis 103: 12-14.)

杜榮瑞、林孝倫與李德冠，2022，關鍵查核事項的揭露與投資人對會計師責任判斷之關係，當代會計，第 23 卷，第 1 期：1-39。(Duh, Rong-Ruey, Hsiao-Lun Lin, and TeKuan Lee. 2022. The effect of the disclosure of key audit matters on investors’ judgments of auditor liability. Journal of Contemporary Accounting 23 (1): 1-39.)

官月緞、史雅男與曾家璿，2022，關鍵查核事項揭露與審計品質及審計報告時效性之關聯，中山管理評論，第 30 卷，第 4 期：705-754。(Guan, Yue-Duan, Ya-Nan Shih, and Chia-Hsuan Tseng. 2022. The association between key audit matter disclosures, audit quality, and audit report timeliness. Sun Yat-Sen Management Review 30 (4): 705-754.)

林宛瑩與許崇源，2008，台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議，交大管理學報，第 28 卷，第 1 期：269-312。(Lin,Wan-Ying, and Chung-Yuan Hsu. 2008. A research on ownership structure and corporate governance performance indicators of Taiwanese business groups. Chiao Da Management Review 28 (1): 269- 312.)

林俊傑、劉梧柏與黃華瑋，2018，公司治理評鑑與財務績效及公司價值之關聯性探討：以台灣上市櫃企業公司治理評鑑為例，商略學報，第 10 卷，第 1 期：23-46。(Lin, Chun-Chieh, Wu-Po Liu, and Hua-Wei Huang. 2018. The relation between corporate governance evaluation and financial performance and firm value: Evidence from corporate governance evaluation of Taiwan listed firms. International Journal of Commerce and Strategy 10 (1): 23-46.)