公司治理機制、多角化策略與高階管理者離職關聯之實證研究

An Empirical Study on the Relationship among Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Diversification Strategy, and Top Executive Turnover

曾益信(Yi-Hsin Tseng)

指導教授 ： 歐陽豪

崑山科技大學/商業管理學院/企業管理研究所/碩士(2011年)

摘要

『公司治理機制』與『多角化策略』對總經理更迭的影響是近來一項重要議題，文獻指出有效的『內部治理機制』可發現總經理異動與公司績效呈負向關係，而『股權結構與董事會組成』中的諸多變數均與總經理異動與呈顯著關係，本文以台灣上市公司為例，從總經理更迭探討『多角化策略』與『年報資訊揭露』對『總經理更迭』間是否存在顯著的影響。
本研究以2004年至2009年間台灣6,183家上市櫃公司為樣本，其中發生816件總經理更迭樣本(13.2%)，在總經理持股比率與總經理平均更迭分析中，本研究發現：台灣上市公司總經理更迭率會隨著總經理持股率增加而降低，其中，總經理有86.52%的平均離職比例發生在持股比率低於5%以下，在產業分布方面：以電子零組件的總經理更迭次數最高，其次為光電業，半導體業第三，汽車業最低，水泥工業次之，在年度方面：2008年總經理更迭次數最高， 2007年次之，此二年正好為全球金融危機發生之時機。
以logistic 迴歸進行高階管理者更迭之實證研究與分析，我們發現，績效欠佳公司(尤其是絕對績效)的總經理更迭機率較高，董事會比較會根據絕對市場績效指標或會計績效指標來決定總經理的去留，『總經理的持股率』與『總經理為家族集團成員』對總經理更迭機率均為顯著負向影響；董事長兼任總經理的係數顯著為正，此外，在衡量『總經理持股率』對『總經理更迭率』的影響時，本研究發現：『總經理更迭率』隨總經理持股率增加先呈下降，達某一臨界點後再上升之U字型的非線性相關。
此外，『外部大股東的存在』，總經理更迭機率愈高，這是四項外部公司治理機制中唯一顯著有外部治理機制作用的變數，『機構法人持股比率』對『總經理更迭機率』反而有抑制效果；『總多角化策略』與『年報資訊揭露總分』對『總經理更迭率』分別呈現不顯著的負向與正向影響；相關多角化策略對總經理更迭為顯著負向影響，非相關多角化策略對總經理更迭為不顯著正向影響，財務與營運透明度對總經理更迭為顯著正向影響，股權結構與董事會組成對總經理更迭為顯著負向影響。
本研究是國內第一篇同時探討產業多角化策略與年報資訊揭露對總經理更迭影響的論文，希望本研究的實證結果能補充國內此一領域的實證。

關鍵字

總經理更迭 ； 公司治理機制 ； 多角化策略 ； 年報資訊揭露

並列摘要

This paper focuses on the corporate governance mechanisms and diversification strategy to CEO turnover, which is an important issue in recent. Literatures pointed out that effectiveness of internal corporate mechanism would find negative relation between CEO turnover and performance index. And, there exist remarkable relation between of “ownership structure and components of board of directors” and CEO turnover. Furthermore, we adopt Taiwan listed companies to discuss effect of “diversification strategy and annual report information disclosure” on the possibility of CEO turnover.
We use 6,183 Taiwan listed firms to be our samples during 2004 to 2009, where there happened 816 CEO turnovers, which is 13.2% in total samples. In the analysis of shareholdings of CEO and CEO turnovers, we find that CEO turnover ratio of Taiwan will reduce when CEO shareholdings increase. There exists 86.52% of CEO turnover when CEO shareholdings are lower than 5%. Electronic spare part's industy has the highest CEO turnovers, next is the light electrical industry, the semiconductor industry third, the automobile industry is lowest, cement industry next lowest. The highest CEO turnovers happen during 2008, next is 2007, and this two years are the timing which the global financial crisis happened.
And we adopt logistic regression to implement empirical analysis, and the findings are: the turnover rate of CEO is significantly higher in poorly performed corporations, especially, for absolute market and accounting performance index. The board of directors will more likely to deciside CEO turnover according to absolute market and accounting performance. Both CEO shareholdings and CEOs who belong to controlled family members have significantly negative effect on CEO turnover rate. Chairman is also CEO has significantly positive coefficient. In addition, the relationship between CEO shareholding and CEO turnover present non-linear－U shaped.
In addition, the existence of outside blockholdering, the higher probability of CEO turnover is. It is the only significant variable which has external governance mechanism effect among four variables. The greater institutional investor shareholding, the lower probability of CEO turnover is. There exixt insignificantly negative and positive effect of diversification strategy and annual report information disclosure on CEO turnover rate. Beside, related diversification strategy has significantly negative effect on CEO turnover, while unrelated diversification strategy has insignificantly positive effect on CEO turnover. Financial and operational transparency has significantly positive effect on CEO turnover, while ownership structure and componennts of board of directors has significantly negative effect on CEO turnover.
This research is the first Taiwan paper which simultaneously discusses diversification strategy and annual report information disclosure on CEO turnover rate. We hoped that our empirical results can supplement this domains’ empirical study in Taiwan.

並列關鍵字

CEO Turnover ； Corporate Governance Mechanism ； Diversification Strategy ； Annual Report Information Disclosure

參考文獻

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