On Cavendish's Perception

Even though Canvendish's theory of perception can pass the test of perceptual presence and perceptual constancy to show that it is a theory with explanatory power, however, there is a problem within the theory which I call the demarcation problem. Considering the epistemological stance of Cavendish's theory, it is a version of ‘Indirect Realism'. Yet this stance will give rise to the demarcation problem, which means that we cannot tell the difference between self-knowledge of our body and perception through her theory. In reality, these two kinds of experiences are qualitatively different and of different objects. I argue that the problem can be resolved by manifesting that perception involves causal processes while self-knowledge of our body does not. Finally, I intend to extend her theory to better understand the workings of perception. Self-knowledge of our body is the foundation of projecting the perceptual field and we perceive the external world as perceiving a bigger me.

關鍵字

Margaret Cavendish ； Perception ； Perceptual presence ； Perceptual constancy ； Indirect Realism

並列摘要

雖然卡文迪許的知覺理論能通過知覺呈現和知覺恆常性的測試，顯示它為一個具有解釋力的理論。但是這個理論本身卻存在劃界問題。她的知覺理論是一種間接實在論，但這種立場將會導致劃界問題：在這種立場下，我們無法藉由她的理論來區分身體知覺和知覺，但這兩種經驗質性上真的截然不同且是關於不同的對象。筆者主張劃界問題可以透過說明知覺帶有因果過程，而身體知覺沒有來解決。最後筆者意圖擴張她的理論以更好地理解知覺運作。身體知覺是投射出知覺場域的基礎，我們知覺外在世界如同知覺一個更大的我。

並列關鍵字

瑪格麗特．卡文迪許；知覺；知覺呈現；知覺恆常性；間接實在論

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