Korea Peace Regime and Its Impact for Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula: An Explanation with a Framework of Game Theory

韓國和平機制與朝鮮半島的非核化：以遊戲理論架構解析

李成宇(Seong Woo Yi)

《韓國學報》 32期 (2018/01) Pp. 37-70

摘要

Reunification in Korean Peninsula through peaceful interaction has been the most critical national goal for South Korean Governments throughout the history. The Korean Peace Regime can be defined as ending militarized dispute, preventing recurrence of war, terminating hostility, and ultimately institutionalizing the perpetual peace that could be confirmed by international community as well as North and South Korea. Practical impediments for the peaceful resolution of denuclearization in Korean Peninsula is that while South Korea has insisted the denuclearization of North Korea as a prerequisite of Korean Peace Regime, North Korea has argued the withdrawal of American Forces in South Korea as a prerequisite. This study will address the weakness of South Korean approach for denuclearization and reunification of Korean Peninsula with the framework of game theory such as the prisoner's dilemma game and the chicken game. Recently, it is said that the recent events such as North Korea's 6^(th) nuclear test and Hwasung 16 ICBM test can be regarded as a game changer for the security in North east Asia including the United States, China, Japan, and Russia as well. This will analyze the effectiveness of South Korean President Moon Administration approach, Korean Peace Regime, as available alternative for peace with the framework of the prospect theory.

關鍵字

Korea Peace Regime ； denuclearization ； functionalism ； game theory