從新古典現實主義論朝貢體系下韓中關係：檢討朝鮮歷史案例，1401~1644

本研究套用新古典現實主義（Neoclassical realism）理論框架，並重視東亞地區本身的經驗。在此基礎上，本研究使用「雙邊市場平台」（two-sided market platform）和同盟理論，解答“何種因素促使朝鮮與明朝合作？而何種因素決定合作程度？”的研究問題。 1401年朝鮮參與明朝主導的朝貢體系之後與明朝建立了雙重不對稱關係（asymmetric relation）：一是不對稱軍事同盟關係，二是基於儒家價值體系的君臣關係。如果明朝與朝鮮關係為物質和理念互相交織的不對稱關係很明顯，那麼屬於下位單元的朝鮮應當一成不變的聽從明朝的要求。但如果檢視朝鮮歷史案例，就會發現：朝鮮並不一定接受明朝的要求而進行合作，即使表現出合作的態度，其合作程度也並非一貫；另外，朝鮮對明朝的政策變化與國際權力分配或理念性因素的變化沒有完全連動。研究結果發現1401年朝鮮參與明朝主導的朝貢體系以來，朝鮮配合明朝的程度的變異性源於儒教理念因素對決策的影響力和同盟義務的比重之變化：首先，促使朝鮮與明朝合作的朝鮮國內因素取決於朝鮮國王的統治能力。明朝與朝鮮共享儒教價值，均接受「治統」與「道統」權威分立結構。然而，從朝鮮國王的角度來看，原意上代表「治統」者是中國天子，絕不是統治東夷之地的朝鮮國王，這意味著參與朝貢體系的朝鮮國王一旦陷入執政危機，其邏輯上可以依賴中國天子的權威，以強化自身權威並突破僵局。因此，若朝鮮國王具有足夠的統治能力能可以控制士大夫官僚階層（道統），朝鮮國王未必採取訴諸於上層權威（即「中國天子」、或是「治統」）的策略，也沒有必要積極協助明朝的要求（如派兵支援等同盟義務）。另一方面，朝鮮決定合作的程度取決於同盟義務的比重。若朝鮮一方負擔同盟義務，雖然不能退出朝貢體系，但爲減輕本國的負擔而努力，導致不願意積極協助明朝（如派兵事宜）；相反地，若朝鮮被明朝要求的同盟義務歸類為小，朝鮮有意願擴大與明朝的合作範圍，也可以積極應對來自明朝的派兵要求。要而言之，朝鮮與明朝合作與否，以及朝鮮與明朝合作的程度，由國際因素(同盟義務的比重)和國內干預因素(儒教理念因素對決策的影響力)所具有的相對大小來制定。如果儒教理念因素對決策的影響力大於同盟義務，就容易作出基於天下秩序的決策，使朝鮮協助明朝的動機最大化；相反地，如果儒教理念因素對決策的影響力小於同盟義務，就容易作出基於無政府狀態的決策，使朝鮮協助明朝的動機最小化。也就是說，在決策過程中，如果兩個因素的影響力差異很大，則很可能產生偏向於具有更大影響力的因素的決策。然而，如果雙方都維持「大」的影響力，那麼在決策過程中無法達成共識，或者決策集團的合作瓦解，使政權就會變得脆弱。

關鍵字

新古典現實主義；朝貢體系；雙邊市場；同盟理論；韓中關係

並列摘要

After participating in the tribute system led by Ming China in 1401, Chosŏn Korea built an asymmetric relationship with Ming China. That is, the relationship between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea included the characteristics of an asymmetric military alliance and monarch-subject relationship based on Confucian values. However, despite the fact that the asymmetric relationship between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea from the two aspects of the distribution of power and Confucianism was as clear as daylight, Chosŏn Korea, the subordinate unit, did not unconditionally submit to the request of Ming China regarding military cooperation (that is, the request to send troops). It can be seen from historical cases of Chosŏn Korea that Chosŏn Korea once rejected the request of Ming China regarding military cooperation, and even when it did accept the request of Ming China regarding military cooperation, the degree of cooperation was not uniform. In addition, changes in Chosŏn Korea’s policy about Ming China were not completely connected with changes in the factors of the distribution of power among states or domestic Confucianism. Therefore, this study’s subjects for inquiry were “what factors accelerated cooperation between Chosŏn Korea and Ming China? And which factors decided the degree of cooperation?” This study attempts to interpret Sino-Korean Tributary Relations by employing the neoclassical theory of international relations, and regards experiences in East Asia as important. Ming China and Chosŏn Korea shared Confucian values. In particular, both countries recognized the separation structure of authority called Zhitong (K. Chitong, 治統), the genealogy of the emperor, and Daotong (K. Dotong, 道統), that is, the genealogy of the Confucian Orthodoxy, under the Confucian political system. In addition, Chosŏn Korea could not help factoring in the costs of strategic alliances when considering whether to arrange military cooperation with Ming China, because Ming China was an external political entity. Under this premise, this study investigated the factors which accelerated cooperation between Chosŏn Korea and Ming China, and those which decided the degree of cooperation by using two-sided market theory and alliance theory. It finds that variability in the degree of Chosŏn Korea’s cooperation with Ming China originated from change in the influence of the importance of alliance obligations and factors of Confucianism on decisions about foreign policies, since Chosŏn Korea participated in the tributary system led by Ming China in 1401. Concretely, it reaches the following conclusions. First, whether factors of Confucianism accelerated Chosŏn Korea’s cooperation with Ming China depended on the Chosŏn king’s ability to rule the country. From the viewpoint of the kings of Chosŏn, the persons who represented authority, called Zhitong (K. Chitong, 治統), were only Chinese emperors and could not be the kings of Chosŏn who ruled 'Eastern Yi' (Dongyi, 東夷). This logically means that the kings of Chosŏn who participated in the tributary system to focus on Ming China were able to strengthen their authority and solve difficulties in holding power in the country depending on Chinese emperors’ authority (that is, Zhitong, 治統) when they were in danger of seizing power. Because of this, if the kings of Chosŏn could control the Shidafu (K. Sadaebu, 士大夫) (who represent Daotong (道統)) and establish enough capability to rule the country, they did not have to take strategies to strengthen their authority in the country by depending on superordinate authority (that is, Chinese emperors or Zhitong (治統)) and they had less motivation to actively cooperate with Ming China’s requests (especially alliance obligations including sending troops, etc.). On the other hand, the degree to which Chosŏn Korea cooperated with Ming China depended on the costs of the strategic alliance. If Chosŏn Korea was faced with heavy alliance obligations, it made efforts to reduce its burden, because it could not break away from the tributary system due to the domestic political system based on Confucianism. And Chosŏn Korea had very little motivation to cooperate with Ming China’s requests actively due to this. In contrast, if alliance obligations requested by Ming China were not too heavy, Chosŏn Korea hoped to expand cooperation with Ming China and furthermore, it would actively respond to the request of Ming China regarding sending troops. In sum, whether and to what extent Chosŏn Korea cooperated with Ming China depended on the relative importance of international factors (the influence of alliance obligations on foreign policy decisions) and domestic factors (the influence of factors of Confucianism on foreign policy decisions). That is, if the influence of Confucianism on decisions on foreign policies was higher than that of factors of alliance obligations, Chosŏn Korea actively cooperated with Ming China by deciding on policies that were faithful to the ideology of the order of ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tianxia, 天下) comparatively easily. On the other hand, if the influence of Confucianism on foreign policy decisions was lower than that of factors of alliance obligations, Chosŏn Korea decided on policies that were faithful to the ideology of anarchy comparatively easily, and its motivation to cooperate with Ming China was minimized. In other words, large differences in the influence of the above two factors in Chosŏn Korea’s policy decisions mean that there is high probability that the decisions reflected the factors with the greater influence. However, if both factors had great influence, there was often a failure to reach a consensus in Chosŏn Korea’s policy-making process, or the base of power was undermined due to the collapse of cooperation in the policy-making group.