中國大陸銀行對產業的放款群聚行為及其對銀行績效之影響

自2006次貸風暴與2008金融海嘯爆發後，中國大陸銀行監管機構為抑制過多刺激經濟資金並限制貸款快速上升，規定銀行的存貸比75%之上限，導致中國銀行業發明影子銀行，創造出大量植基於銀行業與信託業者合作透過財富管理商品架構而製造出的資產負債表外貸款，影子銀行貸款架構之盛行促使中國銀行業對特定時期特定產業之放款趨於集中而產生可能的放款群聚現象。本研究首先延伸Uchida and Nakagawa（2007）使用Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny（1992）衡量（以下簡稱LSV衡量）及非理性LSV衡量的做法，以探討中國股份制銀行及城市銀行對產業放款的整體群聚及非理性群聚的行為。本研究進一步延伸Haan和Poghosyan（2012）的銀行研究模型及研究設計，探討這兩類型銀行對企業放款的整體群聚行為及非理性群聚行對其經營績效之影響。實證結果顯示中國股份制銀行及城市銀行分別對產業的放款，在2009至2010年期間，均發生明顯的非理性群聚行為，股份制銀行在此期間又同時存在顯著的理性群聚行為。這兩類型銀行中持有較多的加權平均風險性資產比率、較高的不良貸款率及較高政府持股比率者，分別相較於具相反特徵的銀行而言，對產業的放款存在更明顯的非理性群聚行為。本研究更發現兩類型銀行的整體群聚行為對銀行績效不具有顯著影響，而股份制銀行與城市銀行對產業放款之非理性群聚行為則對銀行財務績效一致具有顯著負面的影響。本研究實證結果有助於中國的銀行管理者制定企業放款的決策，並提供予金融主管機關管理銀行在放款市場的群聚行為對銀行績效影響的參考依據。

關鍵字

中國；銀行；放款；群聚；銀行績效

並列摘要

Since the 2006 US subprime crisis and the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis , China banking regulatory agencies start to suppress excessive funds of economic stimulation and to decelerate the rapid increase in bank loan. 75% of loan to deposit ratio limit led by the regulators induces lots of shadow bank operations which create plenty of off-balance sheet loans based on the cooperation of banks and trusts through the wealth management structure. The prevailing shadow banking loans promote the possible bank loan herding of Chinese banks on a specific industry for a specific period of time. This study first extends Uchida and Nakagawa (2007)'s approach of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992)'s measure (hereafter referred to as LSV measure) and irrational LSV measure for Chinese Joint-Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs) and City Commercial Banks (CCBs). We further extend Haan and Poghosyan (2012)'s model on banking performance to assess the impacts of performance caused by overall and irrational bank loan herding behavior for JSCBs and CCBs . The empirical results show the significant existence of irrational loan herding for both the Chinese JSCBs and CCBs during 2009-2010. A rational loan herding behavior for JSCBs is also present during this time period. Among these two types of banks, those who are with higher ratio of risk-weighted assets, higher ratio of non-performing loans and higher ratio of government shareholding present more significant irrational loan herding behavior than those banks who are with the opposite characteristics. The results of this study find that the overall herding behaviors of the two types of banks do not have significant impact on banking performance. However, the irrational loan herding behaviors for both of the JSCBs and CCBs consistently have a significantly negative impact on bank financial performance. The empirical results in this study would help the bank supervisors in China to set up the policy of business loans and provide for financial authorities to manage the impact of banks' loan herding behavior on bank financial performance.