本文檢視台灣銀行業內部人包括董監事與經理人持股比例與風險之間的關係,以了解代理問題對銀行風險的影響,而且由於財務困難風險較高的銀行其經理人的經營動機可能不同,因此本文另檢視財務困難風險較高的銀行其內部人持股與風險之間的關係。由於過去文獻指出內部人持股比例與風險可能呈非線性關係,因此實證模型考慮持股比例的一次方項、平方項與立方項,實證結果顯示在全體樣本中,內部人與董監事與經理人持股比例與風險之間的關係均呈顯著正、負、正的關係,但在財務困難風險較高的銀行中,經理人持股比重與風險卻呈不顯著負、正、負的關係,顯示當銀行面對的財務困難風險較高時,經理人的經營 動機會有明顯的差異。
This paper investigates the relationship between the insiders stock holdings and the risk of Taiwan banking industry. Also, since the incentives of managers in banks with higher financial distress risk may differ, we examine the relationship between insiders stock holdings and the risk for banks whose capital adequacy ratios are within the first quarter. The empirical evidence suggests that the relationships between insiders stock holdings and bank risk are not monotonic. Specifically, as the holdings are small, the impact of stock holdings on risk is positive. As the holdings increase, the relationship is negative. Further, as the holdings exceed a certain level, the impact of stock holdings on risk is significantly positive. However, the empirical evidence also suggests that the incentive of managers in banks facing higher financial distress risk differs from the incentive of managers in other banks.