金融海嘯爆發,震撼全球金融市場,造成世界各國經濟的衰退,引發人們對於市場的高度不信任,也暴露出公司在內部與外部監理機制的不佳,使得人們開始對於公司治理的重要性更加關注。由於台灣與中國多數企業皆為家族所控制,所以本研究以台灣與中國金融業為樣本探討在金融海嘯前後,家族持股與董事會效能對於風險承擔之影響。實證結果發現家族持股與風險承擔呈現顯著的負相關。董事會效能與風險承擔呈現顯著負相關。金融海嘯前後風險承擔之比較方面,在銀行業金融海嘯前的風險承擔所影響效果顯著高於金融海嘯後。相反的,保險與證券業卻呈現金融海嘯後的風險承擔所影響效果顯著高於金融海嘯前。綜合以上結果得知,首先,不論是銀行、保險或證券業家族持股與董事會效能的提升,確實可以降低金融業的風險承擔。最後,金融海嘯後,台灣與中國銀行業藉著董事會效能的提升,確實可以有效的降低銀行業的風險承擔,但卻與保險、證券業結果相反,可能在於產業特性的不同所致。
Since the financial tsunami hit global financial markets and lead global economics into recession, people has had little confidence in the market. It exposes the poor mechanism of internal and external supervision, and the significance of corporate governance is getting noticed. Most enterprises in Taiwan and the Peoples’ Republic of China are family-owned businesses. This study involves in the Taiwanese and Chinese financial industry and examines the influence of family ownership and board effectiveness on risk-taking in both the pre- and post- tsunami period. The result shows that a significant negative correlation is found between family ownership and risk taking. There is a significant negative correlation between board effectiveness and risk taking. Bank risk taking increases more significantly in the pre-tsunami period, in contrast to the post-tsunami period. Risk-taking of insurance and securities increases more significantly in the post-tsunami, in contrast to the pre-tsunami period.The increases of board effectiveness in banking, insurance or securities are able to decrease financial risk-taking. In the post- tsunami period, the banking in Taiwan and the Peoples’ Republic of China can reduce bank risk-taking with the advancement of board effectiveness, but it occurs opposite results in insurance and securities, resulting from the difference of industry characteristics.