Evaluation of farmers' insufficient data in income distribution of farmland conversion

In the process of rural land conversion, Chinese farmers always get the unfair treatment. Why Chinese farmer cannot get their deserved part? What is the behavior of that unfair treatment in china? And how to solve the problem? From the rational person hypothesis and profit maximization hypothesis, we use the game theory to probe the situation of different subjects, such as the market demander, the farmers, and the village manager. The conclusion is that: (1) The behavior of that inferior information is whether it is the legal requisition or not, whether there is the intercept policy, and whether to grant the appropriate compensation; (2) The unfair treatment in Chinese farmland conversion to farmers is owing to the inferior information, which includes information acquisition inferior and information distribution inferior; (3) The solution to this problem proposed is a path of coexistence with internal strengthening mechanisms and external optimization mechanism.

並列關鍵字

Farmland conversion in China, income distribution, information inferiority, game theory, internal strengthening mechanisms, external advantages mechanism

國際替代計量

全文下載

主題瀏覽