唯識學「自證」（svasamvitti）理論之研究－以《成唯識論》為中心

本文以《成唯識論》（以下簡稱《成論》）的「自證分」理論為中心，探討「自證」在佛教唯識學中的哲學意涵。「自證」就是心識的自己證知，識的這個特性與「有相唯識論」有著密切的關係。本文嘗試從兩個角度分析《成論》「自證分」的內涵，即「作為量果的自證分」和「作為識體的自證分」。首先，《成論》承襲了陳那《集量論》中關於「自證是量果」的說法，並有所發展。《成論》認為「自證分」是「見分」緣取「相分」的認知結果，而這個結果同時也表現為「自證」對「見分」的證知。這種證知近似於反思性的，在《成論》能-所認知的模式下，它被詮釋為「證自體者必現量」或「內緣」等。這與「見分」緣取「相分」的對象性的認知「法爾不可一類」。另外，《成論》在能-所的模式下又開出了「第四分」，但其建立「證自證分」的理由在邏輯上似乎不完備，本文對此也作了分析。其次，本文討論「作為識體的自證分」和記憶的論證。《成論》偏重心識的「三分」而非「不相離」義，實是為了突出「自證分」作為「識體」的地位。「自證分」作為能-所認知活動的所依，結合了《成論》特有的「識轉變」、「變現」等概念，顯示眾生由虛妄分別而展開的能-所活動，不斷向未來創制新欲望或意義的特性。因此，《成論》的「自證分」理論不僅僅具有知識論的內涵，同時也關注價值論或生存論問題。最後，從記憶現象論證「自證分」的存在是一個比較強的證明，《入中論》對此的批評至少在世俗諦的層面上並不能完全駁倒它。

關鍵字

自證（分）；唯識學；量果；識體；記憶

並列摘要

The thesis in my paper is the theory of ＂self-cognition＂ (svasamvitti) in Cheng Wei Shi Lun (Vijñaptimatratasiddhi). I want to discuss the philosophical significance of ＂self-cognition＂ in Yogacara doctrine. Self-cognition originally means that the mind knows itself. This characteristic of mind has a close relationship with the idealistic stance of Yogacara. I try to analyze two aspects of ＂self-cognition＂ in Cheng Wei Shi Lun, namely, ＂self-cognition as the result of cognition＂ and ＂self-cognition as the substance of cognition.＂ Firstly, the original statement that self-cognition is the result of cognition can be traced back to Dignaga’s Pramanasamuccaya. Cheng Wei Shi Lu has not only followed Dignaga, but also developed its own theory. According to Cheng Wei Shi Lun, self-cognition is the result that the seeing-portion (darsana-bhaga) grasps the seen-portion (nimitta-bhaga). And this result also illuminates that self-cognition can recognize the seeing-portion. The self-cognition which knows itself can be thought as a reflexive cognition. This kind of cognition, in Cheng Wei Shi Lun, is explained as ＂that cognition which recognizes itself must be pratyaksa＂ or ＂the internal clinging to mind,＂ which is totally different from the intentional cognition such as seeing-portion grasping the seen-portion. In addition, I will discuss the fourth division of cognition, namely, the cognition of self-cognition, which is considered as a unique theory of Cheng Wei Shi Lun. But I will show that the reasons to support this statement are not logically perfect. Secondly, I will discuss ＂self-cognition as the substance of cognition＂ and its proof of recollection. In order to manifest self-cognition as the substance of cognition, Cheng Wei Shi Lun pays more attention to emphasizing the three divisions rather than the non-separation of the cognition. Self-cognition is the supporting base for both seeing-portion and seen-portion. It has been combined with some idealistic conception such as ＂vijñana-parinama,＂ etc. in Cheng Wei Shi Lun, which indicates that we always create unceasingly new desires or meanings because of the cognitive activities. It demonstrates that ＂self-cognition＂ in Cheng Wei Shi Lun is not only related to epistemology but the meaning of existing as well. Finally, the proof of recollection to support the existence of the self-cognition is a strong argument. It cannot be denied by the refutation in Madhyamakavatara in the conventional sense.