Perception, Conceptual Construction and Yogic Cognition According to Kamalasila's Epistemology

蓮華戒認識論中的直接知覺、概念作用和瑜伽行者的認識

船山徹(Funayama Toru)

《中華佛學學報》 18期 (2005/07) Pp. 279-298

https://doi.org/10.6986/CHBJ.200507.0279

摘要

直接知覺（pratyaksa 現量）的本質，是印度佛教知識論(pramana)學派(Logico-Epistemological School)的主要議題之一。本文嘗試說明Kamalasīla 蓮華戒（約740-795）如何定義直接知覺，他是Dharmakirti 法稱（約600-660）建立知識論學派後最出色的學問僧之一。在分析的過程中，直接知覺和概念作用（kalpana分別） 的關係也得到釐清。Dignaga 陳那（約480-540）把分別定義為namajatyadiyojana，此複合語通常意味「與名稱、種類等之結合」。另一方面，Dharmakirti 把概念作用界定為「與語言表達連結在一起的認識」(abhilapinipratitih)。有趣的是，他並沒有明說他的定義和Dignaga 的定義有何關係。這促使Santaraksita 寂護和他著名的弟子Kamalasila 認真探討兩個定義間的關係。在指出Dignaga 的定義三個不同的可能的詮釋之後，kamalasila 結論說Dignaga 和Dharmakirti 的定義相同。Dignaga 和Dharmakirti 在認識論見解上另一個明顯的根本差異，是對直接知覺的定義。Dignaga 把直接知覺界定為離於概念的認識（pratyaksamkalpanapodham;依玄奘說法即「現量除分別」），Dharmakirti 則進一步加上「無謬誤」這一要素，即：離於概念且無謬誤的（認識）就是直接知覺(pratyaksam kalpanapodham abhrantam)。本文第二章旨在觀察「無謬誤」的意義。第三章旨在指出直接知覺的定義中——尤其是從瑜伽行者的認識(yogijñana)或直接知覺(yogipratyaksa)的立場——所潛存的幾個難題。特別是探討人們如何完全不受概念分別的平擾，透過直接知覺觀想「一切事物是瞬間存在的」（諸行無常）等宗教上的真理。仔細檢查Bhavanakrama《修習次第》的文脈之後發現，kamalasila 認為瑜伽行者所獲得的知覺應屬於精神的知覺，而非感官的知覺，且只有在到達大乘初地菩薩位時才能證得。Kamalsila 可能是第一位以明確而系統性的陳述，闡明知識論學派所定義的瑜伽行者的認識，應如何連結到大乘修行體系傳統中的論師。

關鍵字

現量 ； 分別 ； 瑜伽現量 ； 二量 ； 法稱 ； 蓮華戒

並列摘要

The nature of direct perception (pratyaksa 直接知覺；現量) is one of the most important topics in the Logico-Epistemological (pramana) School of Buddhism in India. In this paper, I tried to give more or less a general explanation as to how direct perception is defined by Kamalasila 蓮華戒 (ca. 740-795 C.E.), one of the most brilliant scholar-monks of the school after the establishment of the philosophical system by Dharmakirti 法稱 (ca. 600-660). In the course of analysis, the relation between direct perception and conceptual construction (kalpana, 分別) was also elucidated. Dignaga 陳那 (ca. 480-540) defined conceptual construction as namajatya diyojana which usually means 'the connection of a name, genus, etc.' Dharmakirti, on the other hand, defined the same notion as 'a cognition associated with an expression' (abhilapini pratitiḥ). Interestingly enough, he did not explicitly state the relationship between his own definition and that by Dignaga. This fact urged Santaraksita's and likewise his eminent disciple Kamalasila's serious examinations of the relationship between the two definitions. Indicating three different possible interpretations of Dign aga's definition, Kamalasila finally reached the conclusion that what was intended by Dignaga and Dharmakirti was none other than the same. Another basic difference discernible in Dignaga's and Dharmakirti's epistemological views is the definition of direct perception itself. Namely, Dignaga defined direct perception as the cognition which is free from conception (pratyaksam kalpana podham;＂現量除分別＂according to Xuanzang's expression). Dharmakirti added to it the further element 'non-erroneous'; i.e., (The cognition which is) free from conception and is non-erroneous is direct perception (pratyaksam kalpanapodham abbrantam). The second chapter of this paper was spent for the observations on the meaning of 'non-erroneous.' In the third chapter, I pointed out a few problems underlying the definition of direct perception, especially in terms of yogic cognition (yogijñ a na) or perception (yogipratyaksa). Special attention was directed toward how one can meditate on religious truths such as ＂All beings are momentary＂ through direct perception without any intervention by conceptual construction. A careful examination of the passages in the Bhavanakrama reveals that Kamalasila holds the opinion that the attainment of yogic perception, which should belong to mental cognition, and not to sense-perception, is realized when one reaches the first of the ten stages in the Mahay ana bodhisattva praxis. Kamalasila was possibly the first person that gave an explicit and well-systematized statement as to how a yogic cognition defined by the Logico- Epistemological School should be related to the traditional Mahayana system of practice.

並列關鍵字

pratyaksa ； kalpana ； vikalpa ； yogipratyaksa ； pramana ； Dhamakirti ； Kamalasila

參考文獻

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