有效治理的桎梏：當代中國集體抗爭與國家反應

Policing Protest in China: Findings from Newspaper Data

陳志柔(Chih-jou Jay Chen)

《台灣社會學》 33期 (2017/06) Pp. 113-114

https://doi.org/10.6676/TS.2017.33.113

摘要

本文聚焦於當代中國國家對社會抗爭的反應，由此呈現國家治理的制度邏輯。本研究資料來源是1萬餘件集體抗議新聞事件，從2000年至2015年。藉由警察在抗議現場的反應模式，呈現其影響因素。在經驗現象上，本研究的主要發現包括：（1）2000年到2015年，警察以武力回應集體抗議的比例，節節升高；警察對社會抗爭，越來越傾向強力鎮壓；（2）在空間分布上，警察對農村抗爭的鎮壓最為顯著，次為二級城市，最後是大城市。大城市的警察，對於集體抗爭最為容忍；（3）暴力抗議，是導致警察出動到抗議現場及警察逮捕抗議者的重要原因之一；（4）當抗議規模越大時，警察越可能出現在抗議現場，但相反的，警察傾向逮捕小規模抗議的抗議者；（5）警察的行為，受到「誰在抗議」的影響最大，而不見得是「為什麼事情抗議」或「抗議誰」。當抗議對象是地方政府（而非中央或省級政府），當抗爭議題是行政及幹部相關時，看起來會招來警察出現且增加被逮捕的機會，其實背後真正的原因是抗議者是弱勢群體（訪民、宗教群體及少數民族、權益受損群體）；一旦抗議者不是弱勢團體，即便抗議目標是地方政府和地方官員，並沒有增加被逮捕的機會。地方政府對社會抗爭的壓制，是因人、因事、因地而異，它是為了適應地方政府既要服膺中央權威又要達成有效治理兩者之間的緊張關係。地方政府慣用的反應模式足以快速弭平抗爭，但卻犧牲弱勢群體權益，也無法促進社會衝突制度化，更加彰顯當代中國國家與社會之間的緊張關係。

關鍵字

集體抗議 ； 群體性事件 ； 鎮壓 ； 維穩 ； 社會衝突

並列摘要

This paper examines state responses to social protests in contemporary China, thereby demonstrating the institutional logic of governance. The data source for this research is a database of more than 10,000 news events on mass protests from 2000 to 2015. Empirically, the main findings of this study include the following: (1) Between 2000 and 2015, the percentage of police responding to collective protests by force increased steadily; the police were more and more inclined to crack down on social protests. (2) The police’s suppression of protests in rural areas was the most serious, followed by those in second-tier cities, and last, by those in large cities. Police in large cities were the most tolerant of collective protests. (3) Erupting violence was one of the main factors leading to police attendance at protest scenes, as well as the arrest of protesters. (4) The larger the scale of a protest, the more likely the police were to appear on the scene. By contrast, the police were more inclined to arrest protesters at small protests. (5) Police responses were influenced first and foremost by who was protesting and not necessarily by the protest issues or targets. When protests targeted local governments (rather than central or provincial governments), police were more likely to attend the protests and arrest protesters. The underlying reason for police attendance and arresting protesters, however, was that the protesters were members of disadvantaged groups. To pursue effective governance and protect the authority of the central government, local governments faced with collective protests habitually resort to modes of reaction that enable them quell protests quickly, while sacrificing the interests of disadvantaged groups, making the institutionalization of social conflicts impossible.

並列關鍵字

social movement ； collective protests ； coercion ； stability maintenance ； social conflicts

參考文獻

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