中國地方政府土地徵收行為與土地財政關連性：財政分權、地方競爭與政績升遷壓力視角

Study on Causal Links Between Local Governments' Behavior of Land Expropriation and Land Finance in China: Perspectives from Finance Decentralization, Local Competition and Performance Evaluation Pressure

柳金財(Liu, Chin-Tsai)

《發展與前瞻學報》 34期 (2021/12) Pp. 117-145

https://doi.org/10.6737/JDP.202112_(34).05

摘要

中國地方政府已然成為土地徵收之違法主體，誘發農民群體維權抗爭。地方政府在土地徵收過程中存在著多重角色困境，同時扮演著規則制定者／監管者／處罰者／裁定者／執行者／被管理者的角色錯位。本文試圖從財政分權、地方競爭關係與官員政績考核三大主軸，加以分析解釋地方政府非常規徵地行為其背後結構性因素。本文初步結論為：實施分稅制造成的財政收支位移效應及財政轉移支付均等化效果的不足，加深地方政府財政壓力；地方競爭關係中主要以GDP增長為導向，此涉及地方經濟增長與財政收入，這些將形成地方官員的重要政績並深深影響其未來政治職位升遷。因此，地方官員藉由低價徵用高價出讓獲取土地出讓金以充實地方財政收入，充作建設政績工程與形象工程之財源，並以此從事公共基礎設施以利吸引外資提升經濟增長，為其未來政治職位升遷厚植競爭基礎。這就促使地方政府在徵地過程中扮演多重角色，既是市場主體，也是公共管理者，兼具運動員與裁判員的身份，藉此俾助於謀取其經濟利益與政治利益之極大化。

關鍵字

土地徵收 ； 農民維權 ； 地方競爭 ； 政績考核 ； 土地財政

並列摘要

Chinese government has been the illegal subject of land expropriation, which causes peasants' collective behavior of protecting their rights. Local governments play multiple roles in the process of land expropriation with the characteristics of contradiction, such as rule maker, supervisor, punisher, decision-maker, enforcer, and management target. To explain this phenomenon, this paper, based on three axis including financial decentralization due to finance decentralization, local competition, and performance evaluation press, explained the structural factors behind governments' abnormal land expropriation. This paper concluded that the dual deficiencies of transfer effect of tax assignment reforms and fiscal payment policy have deepened the fiscal pressure of local governments. Local competition is centered by GDP growth, which involves local economic growth and fiscal income. All of these indicators are closely related to officials' political promotion. Therefore, local officials use land finance to support their performance by expropriation in low cost and sale in high price so as to extract the differences as main local fiscal income. This income is also used in public infrastructure in order to entice foreign investment for economic growth purposes, which strengthen their future promotion competition in political career. In short, local governments play multiple roles in land expropriation, such as market player, public manager, and the contradictory roles of player and referee. These multiple tasks enable local government to maximize their business and political interests, which are the roots of violation and contradiction of the land expropriation.

並列關鍵字

land expropriation ； peasants' collective behavior of protecting their rights ； tax assignment system ； local competition ； official performance evaluation ； land finance

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