以審計產業專家角色檢測家族企業與審計公費間關係之實證

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Family-Controlled Firms and Audit Fees: The Role of Auditor Expertise

呂婉如(Wan-Ju Lu)

《當代商管論叢》 6卷1期 (2021/12) Pp. 43-67

https://doi.org/10.6852/JCBM.202112_6(1).03

摘要

本研究探討家族企業與審計公費間的關係，進而檢測審計產業專家在其間所扮演角色。本研究預期家族企業股權較為集中，與會計師議價能力較強，應該有較低審計公費；而家族企業由審計專家查核簽證者，因審計產業專家的專業能力可以有審計公費溢酬，可以減緩家族企業的議價能力，故相對於非審計專家查核簽證之公司，其低審計公費的現象可以減緩。實證結果顯示：家族企業之審計公費較低，而審計產業專家對家族企業而言會收取較高的審計公費。本研究進行若干敏感性測試，發現在：（1）發生金融危機事件前後之次樣本及（2）不同審計產業專家衡量方式等不同情境的測試下，顯示實證結果具有相當程度穩固性。

關鍵字

家族企業 ； 審計公費 ； 審計產業專家

並列摘要

This study investigates the relationship between family-controlled firms and audit fees, and further the role of auditor expertise between them. The empirical finding shows that the audit fees of family controlled firms are lower than non-family-controlled firms. In addition, the evidence also shows that the signing auditors charge higher audit fees for the family-controlled firms than non-family-controlled firms. This study also divides the samples into two sub-periods based on the financial crisis and uses the alternative measures of audit expertise to do sensitivity analyses. The results of sensitivity analyses are robust and consistent with our main results.

並列關鍵字

Family-controlled firms ； Audit fees ； Auditor expertise