「反介入」，歷史的教訓告訴了我們甚麼

古原俊井(Toshi Yoshihara) ； 程永光(Simon Y.G. Cheng)

《海軍學術雙月刊》 49卷4期 (2015/08) Pp. 27-35

https://doi.org/10.6237/NPJ.201508_49(4).0002

摘要

一、日本帝國海軍在第二次世界大戰前，針對美海軍的作戰計畫，和當代中共的海上「區域拒止」的戰術思維，兩者之間存在著極為顯著的相似性。二、中共在亞洲周遭海域上不斷迅速發展的海上力量，已引發周遭國家的焦慮，並試圖從歷史上尋求類似教訓的根源。尋找這個問題答案的最大因素，就是北京方面逐漸發展的「反介入」及「區域拒止」的戰略指導及能力－亦即眾所周知其將以軍事力量，希冀阻滯美國在亞洲海域的軍事行動。三、1990年代迄今的北京當局，和當時的東京，均致力於發展特定的軍事選項，以嚇阻（或至少能擊敗）美國在其後花園的干預行為。雙方時空縱使相隔超過80年，但是兩者之間對於如何增加對美作戰的勝算，日本帝國海軍（IJN）及中共海軍（PLAN）之間，存在著驚人的相似作戰思維。四、當時的東京及現在的北京均有相同的共識，一致認為他們的國家將無可避免地自其弱勢的基礎上對美展開攻擊。渠等共同的信念，為於其各自的年代能夠對美海軍的主戰艦－無論是主力艦或航母－展開毀滅性的攻擊，是贏得海上戰爭的最重要的保證。該作戰概念的目標為「損小、效高」，套句五角大廈的術語：中、日兩國均計畫對美國採取「不對稱作戰」。五、雖然美國擁有令人震懾的海軍實力，可是必須艱辛橫越廣大的海洋朝東亞行進，增加了美海軍艦隊龐大的後勤負擔。越是接近敵軍的領土範圍，越是增加了補給和維修的困難，通訊交流的管道更加狹隘。相反的，日本和中國大陸的防禦力量，受益自鄰近後方可支援其持續戰力的基礎設施，這地理上的不對稱，成為他們戰略發展的核心。六、二戰時的日本帝國海軍，以及過去十年的中共海軍，均基於這種的戰略指導方針，來發展其所需之武器及作戰準則。希在此戰略指導下，中日雙方海軍的水下、水面及航空兵力能在戰場上的各個層面，找到美海軍的兵力位置，並主動求戰，以達成全面削弱美海軍戰力的目的。

關鍵字

反介入及區域拒止 ； 以攻代守 ； 反干預戰略 ； 不對稱作戰 ； 地理上的不對稱 ； 襲擾戰略 ； 漸進式削弱敵戰力 ； 截擊作戰 ； 近海積極防禦

並列摘要

1. Imperial Japan's plan for fighting the U.S. Navy before World War II and contemporary China's maritime area-denial tactics share remarkable similarities. 2. China's growing assertiveness in maritime Asia has been sufficiently worrisome to occasion just such a search for lessons in the past. The greatest stimulus for this inquiry is Beijing's emerging ＂anti-access＂ and ＂area denial＂ capabilities-broadly understood as military forces arrayed to complicate or deny U.S. military operations in Asian waters. 3. Tokyo then, and Beijing since the 1990s, struggled to develop military options that would deter (and failing that, defeat) U.S. intervention in their backyards. Indeed, while more than eight decades separated their respective attempts at improving the odds of operational success, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sought surprisingly analogous tactical outcomes on the battlefield. 4. The consensus in Tokyo and Beijing held that their nations would invariably fight from positions of weakness. To level the playing field, Japan and China relied on innovative doctrines, tactics, and technologies to give their nations a fighting chance. They converged on comparatively cheap and expendable weaponry that was lethal to highly-prized, capital-intensive American naval assets. This reflected the shared belief that landing devastating blows on capital ships of their respective eras-the battleship and the aircraft carrier-held the most promise for victory at sea. The goal was to impose disproportionate costs on the adversary. In current Pentagon jargon, they planned to wage ＂asymmetric warfare＂ against the United States. 5. While the United States possessed a formidable naval force, it had to slog across the vast ocean to reach East Asian waters, imposing enormous logistical burdens on the U.S. fleet. The closer it neared enemy territory, the more difficult re-supply and maintenance became as lines of communication stretched ever thinner. By contrast, Japan and China enjoyed the home-court advantage. As resident powers, they possessed intimate knowledge of their own neighborhoods. Japanese and Chinese defending forces also benefited from their proximity to support infrastructure located just behind them. This geographic asymmetry is central to the development of their strategies. 6. To implement these strategies of exhaustion, the IJN then, and the PLAN over the past decade, developed weapons and honed doctrines that would cut the opponent down to size. Both services actively sought to engage the U.S. Navy in an attritional contest across the undersea, surface, and air domains.

並列關鍵字

Anti-Access/Area Denial(A2/AD) ； Defense by Offense ； Counter- Intervention Strategy ； Asymmetrical Operation ； Geographic Asymmetry ； Strategies of Exhaustion ； Progressive Reduction Strategy ； Interceptive Operation ； Near-seas Active Defense