多重誘因機制與組織績效：理論分析與實證研究

Multiple Incentives and Organizational Performance: Analytical Model and Empirical Analysis

李伶珠(Lee, Ling-Chu) ； 劉毅馨(Liu, Yi-Hsin) ； 孔憲成(Kung, Shian-Cheng)

《屏東大學學報-管理類》 1期 (2018/12) Pp. 59-93

摘要

本研究依據代理理論與競賽理論，探討多重誘因機制對組織績效的影響。首先利用分析性模型推導，預測當個人或團體的績效誘因愈高，營業單位的經營績效愈好；當風險程度越高時，員工努力後獲得酬勞的不確定性增加，則會降低員工努力的意願與營業單位的經營績效。其次，當公司同時採用個人績效誘因、團體績效誘因與升遷誘因時，三種酬勞誘因彼此具有抵換關係。當工作特性較需要團隊合作時，應提高團體績效誘因，降低升遷誘因。本文利用一家大型汽車公司所提供的2001年至2004年間的營業單位財務績效、員工績效及酬勞資料進行實證分析。研究結果支持個人或團體績效誘因越高，及酬勞風險越低，越有利於提高組織績效。

關鍵字

代理理論 ； 競賽理論 ； 績效 ； 誘因

並列摘要

Based on the agency theory and tournament theory, this study explores the effect of multiple incentives on organizational performance. First, an analytical model is derived to predict that better individual performance-based incentives or group performance-based incentives yield superior organizational performance. With a higher degree of risk, the uncertainty of an employee's reward compensation increases, therefore reducing the willingness of the employee's devotion and consequently organizational performance. Second, when a company employs individual performance-based incentives, group performance-based incentives, and promotion incentives simultaneously, these three incentives have a tradeoff relationship among each other. If a job requires teamwork to succeed, then group performance-based incentives should be enhanced, while promotion incentives should be reduced. In the empirical study, this paper utilizes data on financial performance, employee performance, and compensation data of a big automobile corporation during the period 2001-2004. The results support the hypothesis that organizational performance increases with individual performance-based incentives or group performance-based incentives and decreases with risk in reward compensation.

並列關鍵字

Agency theory ； Tournament theory ； Performance ； Incentives