Analysis of Evolution Model of Enterprise Collaborative Innovation Behavior Based on Government Regulation

Yang Zhao ； Zi-long Wang

《IETI Transactions on Social Sciences and Humanities》 6卷 (2020/03) Pp. 1-18

https://doi.org/10.6896/IETITSSH.202003_6.0001

摘要

based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper studies the evolutionary game process of enterprises' collaborative innovation behavior, analyzes the benefits and costs of participants and the optimal benefits of the system, and discusses the stability strategy in different states.By establishing a multi-agent evolutionary game model, the traditional replication phase diagram is expanded from 2d to 3d, the effect of government regulation on corporate collaborative innovation behavior is analyzed, and the mechanism of corporate collaborative revenue distribution is discussed.The results show that synergetic benefits, synergetic costs, speculative benefits and rewards and punishments have great influence on the evolution path.Enterprises can improve the consciousness of resource sharing, establish a reasonable system of collaborative income distribution and reduce collaborative cost to realize the development of collaborative innovation.The government can clearly define its own functions, establish a reasonable reward and punishment system, provide comprehensive services, and build a collaborative innovation platform to promote enterprises' collaborative innovation.

關鍵字

Government regulation ； Collaborative innovation ； Evolutionary game