The Relationship Between Executive Incentives and Company Innovation Investment

Yehui Zhu

《World Scientific Research Journal》 7卷12期 (2021/12) Pp. 88-95

https://doi.org/10.6911/WSRJ.202112_7(12).0016

摘要

Senior executives are the core personnel of the company's important decision‐making, and have an impact on the company's investment activities and resource allocation. Based on 2012‐2019 A non‐financial company data, empirical methods are used to explore the relationship between executive incentives and corporate innovation investment. The study found that when executive compensation incentives and equity incentives reach a certain level, the promotion of innovation investment is reduced and there is a threshold effect. Further research also found that this effect is more obvious in state‐owned enterprise compensation incentives and non‐state‐owned enterprise equity incentives.

關鍵字

Salary incentives ； Equity incentives ； Innovative investment

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