經理人薪資誘因與公司績效

Executive Compensation Incentive and Firm Performance

簡妏玲(Wen-Ling Chien)

指導教授 ： 陳明園

淡江大學/商學院/產業經濟學系碩士班/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2007.00797

摘要

本研究以西元1996年至2004年台灣證券交易所上市之非金融業公司為取樣對象，並以該公司經理人薪資最高者為研究對象，探討經理人薪資與績效之關係。實證分析包含兩階段的研究設計，第一階段為經理人薪資決定與調整迴歸式，強調外部經理人勞動市場對決策經理人「市場均衡薪資」的決定；第二階段為公司之財務績效迴歸式，以薪資誘因變數做為績效迴歸式的主要解釋變數，並考慮經理人在其職位上之工作年資與薪資誘因間的交叉效果，探討經理人之薪資誘因與公司績效之間的關係。
研究發現，我國公司在訂定與調整經理人薪酬時，會將外部經理人勞動市場基於公司特質與經理人個人特質變數以及公司經營績效變數所決定之酬勞行情納入考量。此外，薪資誘因對於會計績效之資產報酬率大多具正面的影響；然而，對於市場績效之普通股報酬率大多呈負面影響。若將經理人在其職位上之工作年資對薪資誘因之交叉效果加入衡量普通股報酬率之迴歸式，則薪資誘因對普通股報酬率除少數為不顯著之負面效果外，其餘皆為正面之影響；而年資變數和薪資誘因之交叉效果對普通股報酬率大多存在負面之影響。因而薪資誘因對於市場績效之影響方向，須取決於正負面效果之力量。

關鍵字

經理人薪酬 ； 薪資誘因 ； 公司績效

並列摘要

This paper takes the non-financial listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation from 1996 to 2004 as samples. We take the top executives' wages as the research objective, investigating the relationship between the top executives' wages and the companies’ performance. The empirical analysis includes two-stage research design. The first stage is the regression of the determination and adjustment of the top executives' wages. The second stage is the regression of these companies’ financial performance considering several wages incentive variables and the cross effect among the top executives' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables, we research into the relationship between the executives' wages incentive and the company's performance.
Our main findings are as follows: The companies in Taiwan will take account the equilibrium wages of the external managerial labor market based on the companies’ characteristics and the executives’ personal characteristics to determine and adjust the executives’ wages,. The wages incentive variables mostly have positive influence on the rate of returns of assets (ROA) which proxies the accounting performance. However, the wages incentive variables mostly have negative influences on the rate of returns of common stock (RTN) which proxies the companies’ market performance. If the cross effect among the top executives' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables are added to the RTN regressions, mostly wages incentive variables have positive influence on RTN, while mostly cross effects among the top executives' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables have negative influences on RTN. Therefore the direction of the influence of the market performance to the wages incentive depends on the positive or negative strength which one is greater.

並列關鍵字

Executive compensation incentive ； Firm Performance

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