公司治理是現代企業制度中最重要的組織架構,其核心是建立所有者(股東)對經營者(經理人)的有效監督與制衡機制,其目標是保證股東利益的最大化,而常見的做法是設置獨立董事或審計委員會等外部監督機制,來預防或追究經理人的道德風險,還有加強重要事項揭露和資訊透明等等。但是中國高階主管薪酬顯現了一些現象,即公司淨利下降,高階主管卻坐領高薪,無法推定高額的激勵獎酬制度能帶來較佳的財務績效,並沒有解決股東與經理人利益不一致的代理問題。因此本研究的目的在於探討中國大陸公司治理和財務績效的關係,不同的公司治理情況是否會有不同的財務績效,並且探究金融業的特殊性,和其不同於一般企業的公司治理;還有高階主管薪酬和財務績效的關係,高階主管的薪酬是否和公司財務績效有正向關係。本研究的樣本期間為2007至2011年,共24家上市金融業公司,採用追蹤資料 (Panel Data) 模型,得到公司規模、董事會規模較大及高階主管薪酬較高的中國上市金融業公司其財務績效反而比較差,可能的原因是公司規模擴大後導致規模不經濟,或是董事會規模擴增後導致決策品質下降,至於薪酬制度失靈的原因可能是中國市場經濟發展較晚,有嚴重的資訊不對稱現象,所以勞動市場機制無法有效發揮有關。本研究也發現高階主管薪酬與公司績效間存在顯著的U型二次曲線關係,亦即薪酬和財務績效有先降後升的關係。本研究還發現董事會規模對金融業高階主管薪酬有正向影響,原因可能是董事會規模擴大後不少高階經理人也兼任董事有關;監事會規模、資本適足率和公司績效對金融業高階主管薪酬有負向影響,原因可能是監察人會監督高管薪酬,而資本適足率和公司績效對高管薪酬的負向關係則是因為大陸國有銀行受到政府政策上的支持(使績效較佳和資本適足率較高)和限制(使薪酬較低)有關。最後本研究發現公司績效對資本適足率有正向影響,可得知獲利較佳較易累積自有資本,使資本適足率提升。
Corporate governance is the most important organization in the modern enterprise, that establish the effective supervision balances of the owners of operator, that to guarantee the maximization of shareholders interests, and set of independent directors or the audit committee and external oversight mechanisms to prevent managers moral hazard, and strengthen the important disclosure and transparency of information. Top executive compensation in China reveals a phenomenon, that is, even when company is net profit decreases, the top management still receives high compensations, which cannot assure that the higher reward will bring the better financial performance. The top executive compensation doesn’t resolve the inconsistency between the benefits of stockholders and mangers. The purpose of the study is to investigate whether corporate governance, executive compensation and the financial performance has positive relationship in China. In this study, the use of panel data model, the sample has 24 listed financial companies in 2007-2011. According to the empirical evidence of this study, that corporate governance has part impact on financial performance, that firm size and board size have a negative impact on financial performance, because higher firm size reveals Diseconomies of scale, and higher board size reveals managing ability decreases. The study also found that executive compensation has a U-sharp effect on financial performance. The study also found that board size have a positive impact on the executive pay, because higher board size mean top executive is inside directors. The study also found that supervisors board size, capital adequacy ratio and financial performance have a negative impact on the executive pay. The reason that supervisors board have Supervise the executive pay, and China state-owned banks are supported by the government policy and the limit that compensation system failure due to the Chinese market developing late, there is serious information asymmetry, so the labor market mechanism cannot effectively work. The study finally found that financial performance have a positive impact on the capital adequacy ratio because better financial performance have better capital adequacy ratio.