本文以我國上市公司總經理的薪酬為研究對象,建立其薪酬的追蹤資料(panel data),來探討高階經理人薪酬變動的決定因素,其主要目的是設計適當的實證模型,檢驗外部經理人勞動市場(external Managerial labor market)對於經人薪酬調整的影響。本文的實證結果呼應經濟文獻中有關工資理論的發現,驗證了外部經理人勞動市場在決定我國經理人薪酬時所扮演的重要角色。公司在調整總經理薪酬時,會因應經理人薪酬低於(高於)外部勞動市場基於公司特質與經理人個人特質所決定的均衡薪酬,來做必要的增加(減少);同時,當薪酬低於場均衡值時之調升幅度,大於當薪酬高於均衡值時之調降幅度。我們發也現,這些薪酬變動的趨勢因不同產業而有明顯的差異;相較於製造業公司,電子業公司之總經理薪酬對於其外部勞動市場的變化有較高的敏感度。
The purpose of this study is to explain the determinants of the changes in executive compensation for Taiwan's listed companies. We construct a panel using compensation data and develop an appropriate empirical framework to emphasize the influence of the ”market rate” determined by the external managerial labor market on the setting of executive pay. Empirical results indicate that market comparisons are the main drivers of the changes in executive pay. There are adjustments towards the market rate for both underpaid and overpaid executives. Those executives that have been underpaid (overpaid) are likely to have their pay significantly increased (reduced) in the subsequent period. Meanwhile, the estimated adjustment factor by which the pay moves toward the market rate for underpaid executives is greater than that for overpaid executives. Executive compensation in the electronic industry is more sensitive to the external labor market than compensation in other manufacturing industries.