摘要 為減緩高階經理人因為薪酬而操弄會計盈餘之問題,過去文獻建議公司使用市場績效衡量高階經理人之績效。然而,市場績效可能來自於高階經理人自身之努力,亦可能來自於產業景氣(運氣)。因此,本研究以台灣上市、櫃公司為研究對象,樣本期間為2005至2011年,探討高階經理人薪酬是否與其自身努力以及運氣有關,並進一步探討外部公司治理良窳是否會影響高階經理人薪酬來自於好運之部分。實證結果顯示,高階經理人薪酬與其自身努力與運氣呈現顯著正相關,表示高階經理人除了因為自身努力而得到較高薪酬外,確實也因為產業景氣較好而獲得較高薪酬,且進一步發現高階經理人薪酬之現金紅利來自於好運之情況較多。且當公司外部公司治理機制較佳時,會降低高階經理人因為好運而獲得薪酬之部分;當外部公司治理機制較差,則會提高高階經理人因為好運而獲得薪酬之部分,表示外部公司治理可以發揮其監督效果,減緩高階經理人因為好運而獲得薪酬之部分。本研究亦進一步發現家族企業之高階經理人因為好運而獲得薪酬的程度顯著高於非家族企業,表示相較於非家族企業,家族企業之高階經理人較可能因為產業景氣較好而獲得較高之薪酬。
Abstract Prior research suggests that firms use market performance as executives’ performance measure to mitigate the incentive problem of accounting earnings manipulation. However, market performance include the firm-specific performance (executive’s effort; Skill) and exogenous shocks (industry performance; Luck), therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine whether firms pay for executives for effort and luck? And whether better external governed firms influence the pay sensitivity to Luck? The empirical results find positive pay sensitivity to skill and luck, that means the executives’ pay not only increases more with effort, but also increases with industry performance, in particular cash bonus. This research also finds that better external governed firms (board independence and blockholder) pay their executives less for luck, whereas the firms with poor external corporate governance (Deviation) pay more for luck. That means the better external corporate governance can play the role of monitoring to reduce the executives’ pay sensitivity to luck. This study further finds that the executives with family firms pay sensitivity to more luck than non-family firms.