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Research on the Influence of Equity Incentive on the Performance of Listed Companies

摘要


Equity incentive is an important incentive mechanism in the governance of listed companies. This article uses 3310 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2007 to 2019 as samples, and measures the company's performance by total asset return, net asset return, and Tobin'Q. It conducts an empirical test of the relationship between equity incentives and listed company performance. To investigate whether equity incentives can improve company performance. The conclusions are as follows: (1) No matter what indicators are used to measure company performance, equity incentives are positively correlated with company performance. When the listed company implemented equity incentives, the return on total assets increased by 0.95%, the return on net assets increased by 1.78%, and Tobin'Q increased by 0.1571. The implementation of equity incentives by listed companies can alLeviate the information asymmetry between managers and owners, generate synergy, reduce agency costs, and improve company performance. (2) According to the nature of equity, a sample of state‐owned holding companies and a sample of non‐state‐owned holding companies are respectively regressed. It is found that when the company's performance is measured by the return on total assets and the return on net assets, equity incentives have a significant positive impact on company performance, but The performance of state‐owned holding companies has improved even more; when Tobin'Q measures company performance, the implementation of equity incentives by state‐owned holding companies has no significant impact on company performance, while the implementation of equity incentives by non‐state holding companies can significantly improve company performance. (3) The robustness test was carried out by using the company performance with one lag period as the interpreted variable, supporting the conclusion that equity incentives have a significant positive effect on company performance.

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