以「日本經濟團體連合會」及「日本農業協同組合」為例－日本利益團體在自由貿易政策上的遊說要素與角色扮演

The Lobbying Factor and Role Played by Interest Groups in Free Trade Policy in Japan, as Exemplified by Nippon Keidanren and the Japan Agriculture Cooperative

黃子庭(Tzu-Ting Huang)

《台灣經濟論衡》 6卷1期 (2008/01) Pp. 68-91

摘要

近年來東亞及亞洲地區雙邊自由貿易協定（Free Trade Agreement）盛行，日本在這波雙邊自由貿易協定的洽簽風潮中態度由保守轉為開放，陸續與新加坡、泰國、墨西哥等國簽署或研擬自由貿易協定，並希望藉此做為「日本－東協自由貿易區」的基礎。在自由貿易政策的制定過程，除了國際因素外，國內的利益團體通常扮演一定的角色，也因此一國的貿易政策通常是國內不同的利益團體與政府、議會間的折衝所形成的博弈結果。日本的利益團體在自由貿易政策上所扮演的角色通常十分強勢，因此，本文乃以日本著名的兩利益團體「日本經濟團體連合會」（簡稱經團連，Nippon Keidanren）及「日本農業協同組合」（簡稱農協，Japan Agriculture Cooperative, JAC）做為研究對象，探討其在日本自由貿易政策上的影響。首先，闡述日本利益團體的歷史及經團連、農協的沿革；其次，從制度、議題及策略三方面歸納其成功運作的原因；再次，分別從其在日本自由貿易政策資訊提供者、府際協調者、壓力團體的角色予以比較；最後，歸納出利益團體政治所造成的日本雙邊自由貿易協定的特色。

關鍵字

利益團體 ； 自由貿易政策 ； 經團連 ； 農協 ； 遊說要素

並列摘要

Recent years have seen the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in East Asia and around the Asian continent. In the midst of this trend, Japan has switched from a conservative to a liberal stance, successively signing or considering entering into FTAs with Singapore, Thailand, Mexico and others, and hoping for this to serve as the basis for a Japan-ASEAN FTA. In addition to international factors, domestic interest groups often play a significant role in the formulation of free trade policy, and hence such policy is often a chance-determined result of interplay between different interest groups and governmental and parliamentary institutions. Since Japanese interest groups are generally highly forceful participants in free trade policy, this study focuses on two of the country's most well-known interest groups - Nippon Keidanren and the Japan Agriculture Cooperative (JAC) - to examine their impact on Japan's free trade policy. The study first recounts the history of Japan's interest groups in general and the Nippon Keidanren and JAC in particular. It next induces the factors behind their success from the perspectives of institutions, issues and strategies, and then compares the respective roles of information providers, governmental coordinators, and pressure groups in Japan's free trade policy. The study concludes by inducing the features of Japan's bilateral FTAs that have been created by interest group politics.

並列關鍵字

interest group ； trade liberalization policy ； Keidanren ； JAC ； lobbying determinants