日本財政投融資制度二次改革後代理人問題探討

The Second Reform of Japan's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program and the Principal-Agent Problem

馬道 ； 黃子容 ； 陳又珍

《台灣經濟論衡》 8卷6期 (2010/06) Pp. 48-73

摘要

本文分析日本財政投融資二次改革前後之代理人問題。在改革前，政府與代理機構之間存在著嚴重的代理人問題，日本政府主導之財政投融資旗下之代理機構皆為公家機關，由於政府補助及欠缺市場監督機制，造成營運缺乏效率，且因代理機構財投資金投資不當，造成鉅額壞帳虧損。本文探討二次財投改革的代理人問題能否解決取決於市場面（所發行財投機構債是否能成功從債券市場籌資及營運效率能否能改善）與組織面（政策主導內部改革）。本文著重於市場面之探討，檢視二次改革前後代理人問題改善程度。日本政府要求代理機構發行財投機構債以回歸市場機制，而本文研究二次改革後之財投機構債與國債之關係發現，在改革後市場機制確實發揮作用。另外，在財投機構可以完全從市場籌資的條件（情況）下，改善了代理人問題；相較於某些財投機構雖仍無法完全從市場籌資，需仰賴政府編列預算，但因市場監督機制作用使營運效率提升，也改善了部分代理人問題；還有其他公團（特殊法人）配合政府政策民營化，也藉由公開資訊解決代理人問題，達到政府政策執行之目標。

關鍵字

日本財政投融資制度 ； 財投機構債 ； 2001年財投改革

並列摘要

This paper seeks to analyze how the principal-agent problem affects Japan's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) before and after the second reform of this Program. Prior to the reform, there was a serious principal-agent problem between the Japanese government and the agencies with which entrusted the implementation of the FILP. All of these FILP agencies were public-sector bodies that were in receipt of government subsidies and were not subject to market discipline; as a result, their operational performance was unimpressive. Ill-advised investment decisions made by the FILP agencies led to the incurring of bad debts. The present study examines whether the principal-agent problem can be solved through the second reform depends on attempts made from both the market aspects and organizational aspects. The Japanese government has instructed the FILP agencies to issue FILP agency bonds, so as to bring the market mechanism back in track. In examining the relationship between the FILP agency bonds issued and government bonds since the second reform, the present study found that the market mechanism was in operation following the reform. Additionally, the principal-agent problem can be solved when the FILP agencies raise funds from the markets. Those FLIP agencies that are depended on government budget appropriations for their funding have gone some way towards solving the principal-agent problem due to the market discipline which has also helped to improve the operational performance. The objectives of the government policy are met when other quasi-public sector bodies (special corporations) privatized in line with government policy and the sources of information are opened.

並列關鍵字

Japan's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program ； FLIP agency bonds ； the FLIP reforms of 2001