企業併購交易中董事受任人義務之探討－以交易保護措施與受任人逸脫義務條款之衝突為核心

The Fiduciary Duties in Mergers and Acquisitions Transactions: Focus on the Conflicting of the Deal Protection Mechanisms and Fiduciary Out Clause

林國彬(Lin, Kuo-Bin)

《臺灣財經法學論叢》 2卷1期 (2020/01) Pp. 85-155

摘要

企業併購作為企業擴展事業版圖及資源整合的重要手段，惟企業併購交易動輒涉及數十甚至數百億元（或美元）之規模，不僅對交易雙方股東產生重大權利變動之影響，對整體產業亦有不同程度之影響，而董事會與經營團隊在面對企業併購交易時，亦因其係發動併購之一方或係被併購之目標公司，而可能有不同的決策誘因，又因併購交易的不同型態，也使交易雙方董事會採取不同的因應措施，這些措施都有可能涉及董事受任人義務的爭議，在具體的個案司法審查中，又應以何種審查標準判斷董事會是否違反其受任人義務，本文擬就此進行美國德拉瓦州法院判例之整理歸納探討。在面對敵意併購或公開收購時，敵意併購方可能在經營文化或公司政策等方面對目標公司造成傷害，故目標公司董事會為了使其本身作為繼續存在的獨立營運主體，可能採取防禦措施，對抗併購方的敵意併購，但另一方面，目標公司董事會或經營團隊亦有可能在敵意併購成功後，失去其現有的工作或職位，此種情形在身兼經營團隊的內部董事更為明顯，此時目標公司董事會即有可能基於自利動機而採取防禦措施。因此，防禦措施的本質究竟是為了保護公司或保護董事會成員的利益，乃有以司法審查探究之必要。在友善併購交易中，因為雙方均投入相當的成本，因此如何確保交易能夠完成乃為雙方的共同目標，故在併購契約中會設計交易保護條款，降低第三方介入交易的可能性，然而若第三方所提出之交易對價，優於進行中的併購方所提出之對價，則併購契約中的交易保護措施將成為阻礙目標公司董事會為其股東或公司謀取最佳利益之障礙，故交易保護措施之本質是否具有違反董事受任人義務而應認為對目標公司董事會不具拘束力？或應於個案就契約條款進行審查始可判斷？經由德拉瓦州判決之歸納整理，本文結論認為交易保護措施並非當然違法，而應於個案進行判斷始可認定其是否有效。美國德拉瓦州法院認為，併購交易保護措施如果欠缺一個使目標公司董事會在收到第三方更優出價條件時，能夠有效的脫離與進行中的併購方之交易者，則已經簽訂的併購交易契約將可能構成違反董事受任人義務之要求，而成為無拘束力之契約條款，這個要求對於企業併購實務作業產生明顯的困擾，而美國併購交易實務作業也因此作出了相應的調整，這些經驗都足以提供我國司法審查建立董事受任人義務之架構，也可以提供併購實務作業參考之根據。

關鍵字

董事受任人義務 ； 敵意併購 ； 防禦措施 ； 保護措施 ； 受任人逸脫義務條款

並列摘要

Mergers and Acquisitions (M & A) are important channels through which enterprises expand and integrate resources. However, an M&A deal could involve billions or even dozens of billions of dollars and could have a huge impact on not only the shareholders' interests of both sides but also the structure of the industries involved. The boards might have different considerations and decision-making concerns depending on whether they are acquiring board or target board. They might adopt different responses to different types of transactions which might lead to potential breach of their fiduciary duties. Thus, the author will discuss the proper judicial review standards of directors' fiduciary duties in M&A deal under the Delaware law in the United States. A hostile takeover or tender offer could be a threat to the target company's policy or culture; therefore, the target board might adopt defensive mechanisms to protect the continued existence of the target. However, on the other hand, the board might adopt defensive measures to pursue their personal interests, since they could lose their jobs if the hostile takeover succeeded. Thus, it is important for the court to examine the purposes of the defenses adopted by the board. In a friendly M&A transaction, since both parties put a lot of resources into the deal, it is thus reasonable to have deal protection measures in the agreement to make sure the deal can be completed. However, if an uninvited third party offers a superior offer, the deal protection provision could become an obstacle for the target board to accept the superior offer. Therefore, the deal protection provision might prevent the target board from pursuing the best interest of the shareholders which in turn might lead to a breach of directors' fiduciary duties. This article reviews the judicial review standards for the deal protection provisions under Delaware law and concluded that the legality of deal protection provisions shall be decided on a case-by-case basis. According to the Delaware court, there must be an effective fiduciary out clause in the M & A agreement or in the deal protection provisions in order to make the contract valid and not conflicting with the fiduciary duties of the target board. However, this requirement caused some difficulties in M & A practice. This article will also discuss some responses from the M & A practices to the judicial opinions.

並列關鍵字

Fiduciary Duty ； Hostile Tender Offer ； Defensive Mechanism ； Deal Protection ； Fiduciary Out Clause