公司營運表現之於GAAP規範內盈餘管理及非GAAP報導揭露之關聯

The Relation Between Operating Performance, Earnings Management Within GAAP and Non‐GAAP Reporting

楊晴晴(Ching-Ching Yang)

指導教授 ： 劉啟群

共同指導教授 ： 尤琳蕙(Lin-Hui Yu)

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2020年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202001277

摘要

非GAAP衡量（Non-GAAP measure）於近年來被各公司利害關係人廣為使用，然由於非GAAP衡量所排除之項目為與公司經營核心不攸關者，將依公司之產業特性及經營模式不同而有所差異，引發學者及相關人士對於非GAAP衡量是用以提升資訊價值，及可能淪為經理人操弄財務資訊之手段有所討論。在非GAAP衡量是否淪為操弄手段之議題當中，有學者對於非GAAP報導揭露與公司營運表現之關係進行探討，當中公司營運表現係以公司未盈餘管理前盈餘是否達到分析師盈餘預測作為代理，並得出不顯著之實證結果。然於近年來另有學者提出過去研究中公司盈餘是否達到分析師盈餘預測之衡量中，在分析師盈餘預測的資料使用上存在問題。原因來自於分析師盈餘預測多為主觀，且可能排除GAAP規範內之項目，而導致實質上應為非GAAP基礎之分析師盈餘預測被作為GAAP基礎之分析師盈餘預測使用。因此本研究進而在此問題上進行改良，使用IBES資料庫於2003年開始建置之分析師GAAP盈餘預測資料進行實證研究，以重新檢視非GAAP揭露與公司營運表現之關係。另外，在過去多項對於GAAP規範內之盈餘管理(實質盈餘管理及應計盈餘管理)間是否存在階層關係之研究上，本研究進而納入非GAAP報導之揭露作探討，以觀察此三項可能淪為公司操弄手段之工具是否存在關聯。
我們發現，當公司之營運表現不強健，會顯著地進而使用盈餘管理及揭露非GAAP報導。另外當公司使用GAAP規範內之盈餘管理仍未達到分析師盈餘預測時，會顯著地進而揭露非GAAP報導。本研究之結果對於非GAAP衡量是否將淪為經理人操弄手段之議題上作延伸，期能供予財務資訊使用者及相關準則制定者更多面向之參考。

關鍵字

公司營運表現 ； 盈餘管理 ； 非GAAP報導 ； 非GAAP衡量

並列摘要

Non-GAAP measure has been widely used by various company stakeholders in recent years. By 2019, more than 97% of S P500 companies in the United States had reported at least one non-GAAP earnings. However, since the exclusions in the Non-GAAP measure will be different according to the company's industrial characteristics and business model, it therefore triggers scholars to debate on whether non-GAAP reports are used to improve the information value or to influence stakeholder perceptions opportunistically. In the issue of whether non-GAAP reports are used to influence stakeholder perceptions opportunistically, one study had discussed the relation between non-GAAP disclosure and the company's operating performance. It measured operating performance with meet or beat measurement. The result turns out to be insignificant. However, another recent study pointed out the problem of the meet or beat measurement, suggesting that the use of analysts' GAAP earnings forecasts are practically based on non-GAAP measure. Our study further improved the issue above, using the analyst GAAP earnings forecast database build by I/B/E/S database since 2003, to study the relation between non-GAAP disclosure and the company's operating performance. In addition, prior studies used to discuss the relation between the earnings management within GAAP standard (real earnings management and accrual earnings management), and our study extend the issue to non-GAAP disclosure, in order to see whether there is relation between these perception management tools.
The empirical result shows that when the company’s operating performances are weak, they will significantly tend to disclose non-GAAP reports in further. In addition, among the perception management tools (real earnings management, accrual earnings management and Non-GAAP disclosure), when the companies use the earnings management within the GAAP standard but fail to meet or beat analysts’ forecast, they will significantly tend to disclose the non-GAAP reports in further. The results of this study extend the issue of whether non-GAAP will be used opportunistically, providing more aspects to financial information users and relevant standard setters for reference.

並列關鍵字

Operating Performance ； Earnings management ； Non‐GAAP Reporting ； Non-GAAP measure

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