累積投票制的觀察與思考——以臺灣及中國大陸的實踐經驗為例

在世界各國立法例大多採取任意性累積投票制之浪潮下，臺灣與中國大陸之立法政策頗為不同。臺灣自1966年引入強制累積投票制，實施至今已長達近半個世紀。雖然2001年一度將累積投票制改為任意規範，但實務上發生一系列透過臨時動議修改章程改採全額連記法選舉董監事之方式，進而由大股東拿下全部董事席次之事件，引發各界質疑不斷，因此2011年修法回復強制規範。在此之後，主管機關仍以堅持強制性累積投票制為主要方針。相比於中國大陸，臺灣並沒有過多來自經濟體制變革之外在干預，上市公司存在控制股東之持股結構與家族模式下產生之代理成本亦始終存在。從而基於公司治理之要求，似能理解主管機關堅持實施強制累積投票制之理由。惟觀察相關公司法制之推動所需討論之重要議題，與目前強制累積投票制之實施頗有扞格之處，同時強制累積投票制將不可避免地影響獨立董事之獨立性。若考量加入其他保護中小股東之舉措，將來開放任意累積投票制或許能夠得到更多支持。中國大陸則於1989年起逐漸嘗試使用累積投票制，主管機關多表現為鼓勵「精選層」與「內控規範試點重點公司」在內的眾公司於其公司章程中訂入累積投票制，立法上採取部分強制式的累積投票制至今。惟經本文之觀察，中國大陸累積投票制之實施效果與主管機關近年來大力推動之程度相去甚遠，亦普遍表現為不被業界所接受。究其原因，除有重大經濟體制變革影響持股結構之因素外，係因當前之公司法制相關配套制度中，即已存在若干衝突之處，使累積投票制幾乎失效。例如表決權拘束協議之氾濫、董事提名制度之缺位、有關累積投票制之錯誤觀念與運用、獨立董事之獨立性有失偏頗、董事分期改選制缺乏監管等。雖然在經歷了「股權分置改革」與「國有企業混合所有制改革」後，實務開始出現相對分散之持股結構，主管機關亦開始調整其監管策略，配合行政指導與市場調節機制下，已存在部分堅持累積投票制之上市公司，並可從個案中看到累積投票制保障中小股東權益之重要價值。因此，本文除檢討相關制度外，認為立法上宜考量保持選擇訂入式之任意累積投票制，並刪除部分強制之規定。

關鍵字

累積投票制；選擇訂入；選擇排除；股權分置改革；混合所有制改革；公司治理；表決權拘束契約

並列摘要

Under the wave of the world's legislative laws that mostly adopt the arbitrary cumulative voting system, the legislative policies of Taiwan and Mainland China are quite different. Since the introduction of the mandatory cumulative voting system in Taiwan in 1966, the system has been in place for nearly half a century. Although the cumulative voting system was once changed to an arbitrary system in 2001, there were a series of incidents in which the election of directors and supervisors was changed to a full-pledge method through a temporary motion to amend the Articles of Incorporation, resulting in the majority shareholders taking all the seats of directors, which led to continuous questions from various sectors. Since then, the competent authorities insist on the mandatory cumulative voting system as the main policy. Compared to mainland China, Taiwan does not have many external interventions such as changes in the economic system, and the agency costs arising from the controlling shareholders and family model of listed companies are always present. From this point of view, it seems understandable that the authorities insist on a mandatory cumulative voting system based on the requirements of corporate governance. However, the important issues to be discussed in the promotion of the relevant corporate legal system are quite different from the current implementation of the mandatory cumulative voting system, and the mandatory cumulative voting system will inevitably affect the independence of independent directors. If other measures to protect minority shareholders are considered, there may be more support for the opening of the at-will cumulative voting system in the future. In Mainland China, the cumulative voting system has been gradually experimented since 1989, and the competent authorities have mostly encouraged companies, including the "selective layer" and the "pilot companies of internal control regulations", to include the cumulative voting system in their articles of incorporation, and have adopted a partially mandatory cumulative voting system in the legislation. However, after the observation of author, the implementation effect of the cumulative voting system falls far behind the strength of promotion and fail to reach the expectation the authorities, and it is generally not accepted by the industry. The reasons for this are not only the shareholding structure, but also the existence of some conflicts in the current corporate legal system, which makes the cumulative voting system almost ineffective. For example, there is a proliferation of voting rights restriction agreements, the absence of a director nomination system, the misconception and application of the cumulative voting system, the biased independence of independent directors, and the lack of monitoring of the phased re-election of directors. However, in recent years, after the "shareholding reform" and "mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises", a relatively diversified shareholding structure began to emerge in practice. The competent authorities have also adjusted their regulatory strategies, and with administrative guidance and market adjustment, some listed companies have adhered to the cumulative voting system, and the important value of the cumulative voting system in protecting the rights and interests of minority shareholders can be seen from the cases. Therefore, in addition to reviewing the relevant system, this article suggests that the legislation should consider maintaining the optional cumulative voting system and removing some of the mandatory requirements.