內部人交易限制與總經理薪酬制度之關聯

The Relationship Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and CEO’s Compensation.

張琦琤(Chi-Cheng Chang)

指導教授 ： 杜榮瑞

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2005.10026

摘要

為了要維持證券市場的公平性及效率性，世界各國無不制定法律，企圖對內部人交易作出限制，但執法成效卻不如預期。然而，內部人交易不僅會造成違法行為，甚至對公司的聲譽、股價等等皆會造成負面影響，因此，公司本身應該有限制內部人交易之政策。但若真對內部人交易作出限制，使內部人的預期利潤降低，是否應該從薪酬上給予內部人補償。而亦有研究指出，內部人交易獲得的報酬在傳出有利資訊的公司較內部傳出不利資訊的公司為大，故可推斷若內部人欲獲得較高的超額報酬，必須努力追求公司經營績效的極大化，但若對內部人交易作出限制，將使內部人喪失追求極大化股東價值行為之誘因，故依據代理理論，有必要支付內部人較多的變動薪酬。又經理人的薪酬可由客觀績效指標（例如：總資產報酬率、股票報酬率）決定或是由主觀認定而來，然而對受到內部人交易限制的經理人來說，由主觀認定所決定的薪酬是否較由客觀績效指標所決定的薪酬更具有補償效果。
本研究以民國92年上市櫃公司為研究對象，並使用統計軟體SPSS進行資料分析，以迴歸分析方式進行實證的研究。本研究的研究結果彙整如下。
1.相較於未限制內部人交易之公司，有限制內部人交易之公司其總經理之總薪酬較高。
2.相較於未限制內部人交易之公司，有限制內部人交易之公司其總經理之總變動薪酬較高。
3.相較於未限制內部人交易之公司，有限制內部人交易之公司其總經理之變動薪酬中依主觀認定的部分較高。實證結果發現，有限制內部人交易政策的公司其總經理會獲得較高比例的依主觀認定所決定的當年度現金、依主觀認定所決定的當年度現股兩項具激勵性質的薪酬

關鍵字

內部人交易 ； 總經理薪酬 ； 變動薪酬 ； 主觀薪酬

並列摘要

This thesis aims to explore whether firms with a policy of restricting insider trading compensate their top management for the “loss” arising from not being able to profit from such transactions. Specifically, it examines, in designing chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation contract, whether firms with restritions on insider trading (1) offer more compensation in total (2) have higher proportion of variable compensation, and (3) have higher proportion of compensation determined subjectively than firms without such a policy.
The data on the CEO’s compensation are obtained via a questionnaire survey from 80 publicly traded companies. Corporate financial data are obtained from TEJ database. The main findings are as follows.
1)Firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading.
2)Firms that restrict insider trading use more variable compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading.
3)Firms that restrict insider trading use more variable compensation determined subjectively relative to firms not restricting insider trading.
The implications and limitations are offered.

並列關鍵字

Insider trading. ； CEO compensation ； Variable compensation ； Subjectivity

參考文獻

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