董事會結構與高階經理人變動薪酬關聯性之研究

The Relationship between the Board’s Structure and Executive Compensation

謝佳蓉(Chia jung Hsieh)

指導教授 ： 朱炫璉

國立臺北大學/商學院/會計學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

解決代理問題的方法不外乎是利用誘因薪酬或透過監督方式使高階經理人與股東的利益一致，倘若能透過董事會這樣的內部公司治理機制來管控高階經理人，雖然監督須支付更多代理成本如董監車馬費等，但比高階經理人漫天喊價的變動獎酬更為合理。藉由探討董事會所產生的監督效果與高階經理人的薪酬激勵是否存在替代效果，期望實務界未來在制定高階經理人合理薪酬時有更多的參考方向。
研究對象為台灣上市電子公司2008年至2009年，計704筆觀察值，探討公司董事會監督機制與高階經理人變動薪酬關聯性，以董事會規模、獨立董事席次比率、總經理是否兼任董事長、外部董事持股比、董事兼任經理人比例作為監督機制之代理變數，並控制每股盈餘、公司規模、年度別、公司成長率等其他影響高階經理人薪酬之決定因素，結論如下：
1.董事會規模與高階經理人變動薪酬具顯著正相關，證實了董事會成員越多則公司監督機制越弱，越需要利用誘因薪酬來激發高階經理人工作動機。
2.在制訂高階經理人薪酬時，獨立董事席次比率甚至較高的外部董事持股比，仍沒有發揮該角色應有之監督效果，故尚需以較高比例的變動薪酬來彌補監督機制的不足。

關鍵字

董事會結構

並列摘要

The solution to organizational problem is to keep the interests of top managers and shareholders consistent by means of incentive compensation or supervision. If top managers could be monitored through corporate governance mechanisms such as the board, supervision would entail additional costs to the organization (i.e. payment of supervisors) which could be more reasonable than modifying incentive compensation for top managers. This study determines whether there is a substitution effect between the board supervision and the top managers’ incentive compensation. It hopes to provide added reference in creating reasonable incentive compensations for top managers.
The subjects in this study are Taiwanese electronics companies listed from 2008 to 2009. There are 704 observed values involved in discussing the correlation between the monitoring mechanisms of board and the modification of incentive compensation for top managers. The proxy variables of the monitoring mechanism include the size of the board , the ratio of independent directors, the CEO being the chairman of the board, the shareholding ratio of outside directors, and the ratio of directors appointed as managers. Other decisive factors affecting the incentive compensation of top managers are controlled; these include earnings per share, company size, year, and corporate growth rate. The conclusions are as follows:
1. The size of the board and the incentive modifications for top managers show a significantly positive relationship. This proves that the more members there are in the board , the monitoring mechanism is weaker and it is more necessary to motivate the top managers through incentive compensation.
2. In creating the incentive program for top managers, the ratio of independent directors, as well as the higher shareholding ratio of outside directors doesn’t impact on monitoring as supposed. Therefore, there is a need to compensate for the deficiency in monitoring mechanism with a high ratio of incentive modifications.

並列關鍵字

Board’s Structure

參考文獻

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