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  • 學位論文

分析師行為與盈餘操弄關聯性

Analyst Behavior and Earnings Manipulation

指導教授 : 林修葳
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摘要


本文研究不同預估準確度之分析師對於盈餘操弄公司之追蹤報導數量與頻率之差異,以此反映其於預測服務、成本間之取捨與衡量。本文發現,分析師在既已決定願意追蹤盈餘操弄公司時,會更頻繁地發佈對該企業之盈餘預測。此結果呼應先前分析師致力於透過提供難做盈餘估計企業即時訊息以服務資本市場之文獻結果一致。實證結果也顯示,分析師發佈預測總量會隨公司裁決性應計數絕對值增加而減少,表示諸多分析師因成本或大於其所帶來的利益而放棄追蹤盈餘操弄公司。本研究更進一步發現,預測記錄較好的分析師較傾向選擇放棄研究盈餘操弄公司,此或緣於其顧慮自己的預測記錄受負面影響而避免覆蓋盈餘操弄公司。相反地,預測記錄較差的分析師則會持續對這些公司發布盈餘預測。

並列摘要


This study examines how differential predictive abilities, measured by analyst EPS forecast accuracy for the other companies, explain the analysts’ decisions regarding continuing versus dropping their coverage of the firms that manipulate the earnings. Such analyses serve to reflect the potential trading off the cost versus the contribution to the capital market associated with following the manipulative firms. I find that analysts would issue the earnings forecasts more frequently for their covered firms that manipulate the reported earnings. Such finding is consistent with the prior studies regarding that analysts aim to serve the capital market with timely information especially for the firms with the reported earnings numbers that are less easy to interpret than the others. This study also sheds light on the question of how the analysts weigh between cost and service before deciding whether or not to follow the manipulative firms. The empirical results show that there is less analyst coverage for firms that have greater absolute discretionary accruals, suggesting that analysts’ perceived costs of covering these firms outweigh the benefits of it. This study further finds that, among those who drop manipulative firms, analysts with better forecast records are more likely to avoid predicting these firms’ earnings perhaps for fear of jeopardizing their accuracy track record. In contrast, analysts with less accurate forecast records are more likely to continue to issue their forecasts for manipulative firms.

參考文獻


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