本研究旨在探討企業董事會之獨立性對於美國企業國際化之影響。國際化可以替公司創造財富增加資本,是公司長遠發展必須面對的選擇。獨立董事的扮演的監督角色以及專業知識,可以為公司的國際化策略提供幫助。而自2001年安隆案爆發而後公司倒閉,獨立董事以及董事會之獨立性成為投資人關注的焦點,之後更在美國引起一系列關於獨立董事之法案修正。獨立董事之法案修正創造由外部力量影響董事會結構,本研究利用這一系列法案修正設立變數以排除董事會之獨立性與企業國際化之間的可能存在之內生性問題。在衡量企業國際化之程度則是採用國外銷售比率、國外資產比率、海外子公司分布比率以及前述三項加總。 研究發現,以海外銷售比率來衡量企業國際化程度,受到法規變動而提升董事會獨立性之公司會降低企業國際化程度。以國外資產比率、海外子公司分布比率以及加總項目來衡量企業國際化程度時,受到法規變動而提升董事會獨立性之公司之企業國際化程度和董事會獨立性之間均無顯著關係存在,亦即董事會獨立性與企業國際化程度並無顯著因果關係。
This study uses U.S. firms as the sample to analyze the association between board independence and firm’s internationalization. We use foreign sales ratio, foreign asset ratio, geographic dispersion, and degree of internationalization as the measures for internationalization and employ the change in board independence regulation after 2001 as the exogenous shock on board composition. We partition the full sample into the compliance group, in which the firms already comply the board independence regulation and have more than 50% of independent directors on the board in 2000, and the non-compliance group, in which firms have less than 50% of independent directors on the board in 2000 but after the regulatory change, have more than 50% of independent directors on the board (since 2005). We then use difference-in-difference research design to examine whether board independence has any impact on corporate internationalization. We find that board independence continuously rises for both the compliance and non-compliance groups since 1997. In our empirical results, when foreign sales ratio is used as the measure for internationalization, the decline in internationalization is more pronounced for non-compliance firms than for compliance firms. Using foreign asset ratio, geographic dispersion, and the degree of internationalization as the measure for internationalization, we find no statistically significant relation between internationalization and board independence.