消費者結構對於雙佔廠商廣告策略及價格策略之影響

The Optimal Advertising and Pricing Strategies for Duopolistic Firms Facing Heterogeneous Consumers

曾慧玟(Hui-Wen Tseng)

指導教授 ： 周善瑜 ； 陳其美

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/商學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.00393

摘要

本論文旨在探討消費者結構對雙佔廠商廠商廣告策略與價格策略之影響。文中考慮雙佔市場，消費者對兩廠商產品存在與否的知曉不同，對於兩廠商產品有不同的心理距離理想點。消費者被區分別為只知道單一廠商的消費者，可視為廠商忠誠顧客、同時知道兩廠商的游移顧客、以及完全不知道兩廠商存在的消費者，各市場區隔消費者皆均勻分布。在賽局第一階段，兩廠商進行廣告策略之選擇，廣告類型共有三種，分別為品牌告知型廣告、產品差異化廣告以及產品別廣告，廠商針對同一種廣告類型作廣告決策。在廣告策略決定之後，第二階段兩廠商從事價格競爭。本文主要研究結果如下：
一、 除非產品效用極高且獨佔廠商忠誠顧客人口極多，否則獨佔廠商執行品牌告知型廣告皆有助於阻絕潛在競爭者的入場。當獨佔廠商預期潛在競爭者會進場的情況下，若產品效用不高且獨佔廠商忠誠顧客很多，抑或是產品效用高且潛在競爭者進場所獲得忠誠顧客與原獨佔廠商的忠誠顧客比例差距不大時，除非品牌告知廣告效果夠大，否則即使廣告成本很小，獨佔廠商不會執行品牌告知廣告。當預期潛在競爭者會進場時，獨佔廠商執行品牌告知廣告後，視忠誠顧客與游移顧客相對大小而定，原獨佔廠商價格可能出現微幅增減。
二、 除非當產品效用高且廠商忠誠顧客比例極高的情況或是在產品效用低的情況，否則忠誠顧客比例較高的廠商皆有誘因執行產品差異化廣告。任一廠商執行產品差異化廣告，忠誠顧客較少廠商產品售價皆會增加，而忠誠顧客較高廠商產品售價則可能增加或減少。忠誠顧客較多的廠商透過差異化廣告可增加其在游移市場市占率或是維持不變。
三、 當產品別廣告效果可使各個市場區隔規模等比例擴大時，忠誠顧客較多的廠商有較高誘因執行產品別廣告。當任一廠商執行產品別廣告後，不影響雙佔廠商的產品定價以及游移市場市占率。
四、 當產品別廣告效果只會使游移顧客增加、非全部市場區隔等比例放大時，除非產品效用很高且兩廠商忠誠顧客相距不大、游移顧客很少，否則忠誠顧客較少的廠商皆有誘因執行產品別廣告。當任一廠商執行產品別廣告後，兩廠商產品價格可能維持不變或降低，但兩廠商價格變動方向並無一致性，使得兩廠商在游移市場市占率可能增加、不變或減少。

關鍵字

告知型廣告 ； 產品差異化廣告 ； 產品別廣告 ； 廣告策略 ； 價格策略

並列摘要

This research focuses on the optimal advertising and pricing strategies for duopolistic firms facing heterogeneous consumers. We build a game-theoretic model to analyze Hotelling competition with imperfectly informed buyers. The heterogeneity of buyers becomes two-dimensional in this paper---buyers differ in their ideal points for a horizaontally differentiated product, and they also differ in their knowledge about the products offered by the firms. The duopolistic firms decide whether to execute advertising. The results are as the following.(1)Monopolist can deter the potential competitor by executing the informative advertising unless the consumer valuations are very high and monopolist has a lot of loyal consumers. The price variation of pre-monopolist depends on the relative size of the loyal consumers and switchers after executing the informative advertisingif competitor entry the market. (2)The firm with more loyal consumers has strong incentive to execute the advertising in product differentiation unless the consumer valuations are very high and it has a lot of loyal consumers, or the consumer valuations are very low. Advertising in product differentiation may lead to higher prices or lower price depending on the quantities of its loyal consumers. (3)The firm with more loyal consumers has strong incentive to execute the generic advertising increasing all market segments. The generic advertising has no effect on the price. (4).The firm with less loyal consumers has strong incentive to execute the generic advertising only increasing the switchers The generic advertising may lead to higher prices or lower price.

並列關鍵字

informative advertising ； advertising in product differentiation ； generic advertising ； advertising strategies ； pricing strategies

參考文獻

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