台灣創投認證效果的相關檢視

The certification effect of venture capital in Taiwan

林佩蓉(Pei-Jung Lin)

指導教授 ： 胡星陽

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/財務金融學研究所/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2010.10119

摘要

創投為一專業投資者，追求高報酬高風險的投資，在投資前會審慎評估被投資公司未來的發展潛力與現金流量以選擇最合適的投資標的，創投也能為上市公司帶來大量的融資現金並提供專業的經驗與資源協助公司成長，同時為考慮自身的績效與市場上的名聲，創投會選擇誠實公開公司資訊，降低公司內外的資訊不對稱，發揮認證功能。因為創投涉入每間投資標的公司的程度不同，發揮的認證功能效果也就有所差異，本篇論文根據不同的解釋變數研究創投參與公司事務程度與認證效果之間的關係，並得到以下結果:

1. 創投投資的公司折價幅度並沒有比無創投投資的公司折價幅度小。這結果與我們所預期的創投在每間公司所發揮的功能大小不同有關，因為創投投入成本所造成的差異，影響創投所發揮的認證效果。

2. 創投擔任不同職位可能影響創投認證效果的大小。創投擔任董事對折價幅度的影響不顯著，在全部產業模型中，大股東虛擬變數對折價幅度則是顯著正相關，顯示創投僅擔任股東一職會降低認證效果；此外，創投擔任監察人可能會較創投擔任董事更有機會發揮認證效果。

3. 創投的投資階段越早，創投越能發揮認證效果。因為投入時間越早的創投，對公司提供的協助大，參與公司決策的程度較大，所掌握的公司資訊也就相對充足，因此較能發揮認證功能。

4. 創投的董事席次比增加無法增強認證效果，但是創投若由董事職位轉為非董事的職位，可能會提高創投的認證功能。

關鍵字

創投 ； 認證效果 ； 折價

並列摘要

A venture capitalist, the expert in the capital market who is always looking for investment with high return and high risk, plays a significant role of supervising and monitoring its investment firms. Besides, a venture capitalist is regarded as a third-party specialist capable of certifying well-performed firms in the market. And the presence of venture capital in the issuing firm can help alleviate information asymmetry between corporate insiders and public investors, as well as mitigating the underpriced level. In this paper, we attempt to verify the certifying function of venture capital and evaluate the level of underpriced is dependent on the degree of involvement of venture capitalists in the target firms.

We compare IPOs backed with venture capital and IPOs backed with non-venture capital from 1996 through 2009 to confirm the certification effect provided by venture capital. And our results indicates that the certification effect is enhanced when venture capitalists serve issuing firms earlier in their stage of life as venture capitalists have enough time to improve the firm’s performance and can fairly evaluate the value of issuing firms. In addition, when the venture capitalist serves as a monitor in the issuing company, rather than a board member or a normal stockholder, the certification effect might be improved through the mechanism of independently supervising and correcting the firm’s operation. Moreover, the transfer of the venture capitalist that positioned as a board member to a monitor will possibly eliminate the underpriced level of the issuing firms.

並列關鍵字

Venture ； underpricing ； certification effect

參考文獻

1. 林象山（民94），「承銷商信譽對新上市股票之影響」，中國財務學刊第三卷，，119-143。

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