- 學位論文
揭露審計公費資訊內涵之探討：財務報表風險及會計師訴訟風險
Information Contents of Disclosing Audit Fees: Financial Reporting Risk and Auditor Litigation Risk
摘要
我國公開發行公司在特定條件，應揭露會計師公費資訊於年報，以使投資人瞭解會計師收取公費的組成要素及內涵，作為判斷公費允當性的基礎，並以非審計公費占總公費的比例判斷會計師的獨立性。而文獻及審計理論顯示審計公費多寡與受查公司風險高低直接相關，故本研究的主要目的在探討公費資訊的揭露，是否能夠提供投資人做為衡量公司財務報表風險的指標，及影響其對於會計師訴訟風險之判斷。 本研究以問卷方式進行，共分二大部分，第一部分探討審計公費對財務報表風險的影響程度，在回收的106份有效問卷中，本研究結果發現：公費上升幅度愈大，財務報表風險愈高；加入會計師意見對財務報表風險的影響後，投資人傾向以意見做為衡量財務報表風險的指標，但當公費上升幅度很大（在本研究設定為上升50%）時，投資人較能感受到審計公費對財務報表風險的影響。因此，審計公費及會計師意見皆可為判斷財務報表風險的指標，而當審計公費變動幅度很大時，審計公費的揭露對財務報表風險的影響更為明顯。 第二部分探討揭露審計公費是否影響投資人對會計師應承受訴訟風險的判斷，進而影響其遭受重大投資損失時，向會計師求償的可能性。本研究結果發現：無論會計師出具的意見為何，在公費資訊揭露之後，投資人認為會計師應負的訴訟賠償增加。可能係因公費的揭露使投資人了解會計師訴訟風險為審計公費之重要組成要素，因此更加認為會計師事務所本應負擔部分的賠償。另外，會計師出具無保留意見時，所承受的訴訟責任較否定及保留意見還重。即使受測者主要為會計系所學生，應懂得會計師僅對財務報表做合理確信，不擔保公司財務報表的正確性，仍無法改變此結論。而這也支持了文獻上的說法，會計師出具無保留意見以外的查核報告，能夠增加其抗辯的能力，適時降低所面臨的訴訟風險。
並列摘要
Financial supervisory commission（FSC） of Taiwan has required public companies to disclose auditor fees when certain conditions are fulfilled. The main reason from FSC is to make auditor fees publicly available, helping investors to understand the compositions of auditor fees and measuring the auditor independence by the proportion of non-audit fees. Prior researches and auditing theories find that auditor fees are determined mainly by risks of companies. This study targets to discuss whether audit fees disclosure provides information which is about financial reporting risk and auditor litigation risk. This paper is separated into two parts and based on 106 valid questionnaires mainly from students of accounting majored. Part I discusses whether audit fees is a sign of financial reporting risk or not. This study finds that financial reporting risk becomes higher as audit fees increasing. When considering the effect of financial reporting risk from auditor opinion, investors tend to use opinion as a signal of companies’ financial reporting risk. But when audit fees increase greatly (50% in this study), investors would take the impact of audit fees into consideration. Consequently, both audit fees and opinion are signals of financial reporting risk and the effect of audit fees would become more significant when the variation of audit fees increases greatly. Part II discusses whether audit fees disclosure influences investors’ consideration of auditor litigation risk and the possibility to sue auditors when suffering great investment loss. The results indicate that the disclosure would increase auditors’ litigation loss regardless of the types of opinion rendered by auditors. These are possibly because investors fully understand that litigation risk is a primary determinant of audit fees; therefore, they would take auditors’ litigation payment for granted. In addition, the results also indicate that auditor litigation loss is expected to be the highest when unqualified opinion is rendered, even when participants are accounting-majored students who understand that auditors only make reasonable assurance of financial statements. These results indicate that modified reports provide some defense against auditor litigations, consistent with prior researches.