政黨分歧與國會衝突解決之分析－以民進黨執政時期為例（2000-2008）

The Analysis of the Party Cleavage and Conflict Resolution in Legislative Yuan－A Case Study of the Democratic Progressive Party Ruling from 2000 to 2008 A.D.

林隆瑲(Lung-Chiang Lin)

指導教授 ： 陳明通

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2011.00590

摘要

立法院為利益匯集所在，政黨為求反映民意並且追求執政權力，國會乃成為政治鬥爭與利益競逐的關鍵場所。在我國憲政體制的運作下，民進黨執政時期乃為分立政府型式，少數執政導致國會的對立衝突更加激烈，探討此一時空環境下的國會政黨衝突解決對我國政治發展有其意義。
本研究採歷史制度主義途徑，藉由政黨對立因素之探討，將「意識型態對立」與「民主規則歧異」視為影響政黨分歧的基礎，並將制度視為在歷史發展脈絡中串連政黨互動過程的關鍵因素，透過議案審議過程中不同的政黨互動方式及憲政爭議處理機制的運作，探討民進黨執政時期重大政黨分歧政策或法案的國會對立衝突能否解決。
依本研究之探討，若朝野政黨某一方強行處理爭議議案，則容易演變成「議程阻絕且議事抗爭」之政黨衝突模式。政黨間的互動若發展至此，對於國會最後審查結果定有一方無法接受，意味政黨對立程度已經嚴重到國會制度無法解決衝突的地步，乃須透過憲政爭議處理機制來化解政黨衝突。
黨團協商制度功能的發揮對化解政黨衝突至為重要，更是分立政府下少數執政賴以獲得國會多數支持的重要制度。而大法官會議從憲政體制運作層面做出解釋，並針對憲政運作爭議提出處理方式，若能兼顧政黨的政治考量，則可藉此化解政黨衝突，此一途徑對民進黨而言乃為最有利之處理方式，因而產生路徑依賴。
我國既有政治分歧反映在政黨意識型態對立上，而在分立政府運作下造成政黨以民主遊戲規則為標的以競逐權力，國會制度與憲政爭議處理機制能化解政黨在國會的衝突，然而亦有其無法處理之部分。依本研究之探討，統獨意識型態對立、推動轉型正義，以及藉由設定民主規則以維護政黨重大利益而產生之爭議，乃為民進黨執政時期引發國會政黨衝突之根源。當中涉及轉型正義和攸關政黨執政利益之爭的議案，國會衝突皆無法解決，其背後所寓含的政黨分歧亦為國會制度及憲政爭議處理機制所能處理之界限。

關鍵字

政黨分歧、政黨衝突；立法院；民主進步黨；分立政府；黨團協商

並列摘要

Legislative Yuan, the parliament in Taiwan, a place gathering interests, is full of political struggles and interest competitions for parties to reflect public opinion and seek ruling power. Under the constitutional system, the period under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is divided government as minority ruling which leads the party conflict to become more violent in Legislative Yuan. Under this situation, discussing resolutions of party conflict in parliament are very meaningful for the political development in Taiwan.
The approach in the study is historical institutionalism. By discussing the factor of party conflict, it considers both ‘opposition of ideology’ and ‘cleavage of democratic rules’ are the foundations of party cleavage and institution is the key factor connecting party interacting process in history developing. Through different party interacting types and constitutional dispute resolution system operated in bill examining procedure, this study discusses whether the party conflict of important policies or bills would be resolved or not when government ruled with DPP.
According to this study, if one party deals with bills in force, it would easily cause the party conflict model--‘agenda obstruction and parliament strike’, and then the other wouldn’t accept the examining result. It means that the party conflict is too serious to resolve with parliamentary institution, the party would resolve the conflict through the constitutional dispute resolution system.
The institution of Party Caucus Negotiation plays an important role on resolving party conflicts. Moreover, it is important to be the majority in parliament under divided government ruled by the minority. About the dimension of constitutional operation, the Council of Grand Justices delivers the constitutional interpretation. If it also concludes political consideration, party conflict would be resolved. This is the best way to resolve conflict for DPP and lead to the path dependence.
In Taiwan, political cleavage reflects the opposition of ideology among parties. Under the divided government, parties seek power through democratic rules. Although parliamentary institution and constitutional dispute resolution system can resolve the conflicts in parliament, there is still something that they can’t deal with. In this study, the cleavages of Taiwan Independence vs. Unification Ideology, transitional justice and maintaining important party interests through setting democratic rules, they are the reasons which cause party conflict. However, if the bills are related to transitional justice or interest of administration, party conflicts aren’t been resolved. Furthermore, the party cleavages of those bills are also the limits of parliamentary institution and constitutional dispute resolution institution.

並列關鍵字

party cleavage ； party conflict ； Legislative Yuan ； Democratic Progressive Party ； divided government ； party caucus negotiation

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