中國崛起,伴隨軍事、經濟實力的快速增長與累積,以及在外交、區域合作的積極展現,使得中國更擅長併用胡蘿蔔與棍棒政策施加影響力,創造其吸引與威嚇性。2013年,中國提出大型「一帶一路」倡議,積極與周邊沿線國家簽訂雙邊性的基礎建設援助開發計畫,藉由提供經濟誘因以擴增其於區域的影響力。 然而,我們觀察到東南亞國家對於中國經濟誘因的回應,在歡迎/支持的態度上仍具程度差異。為解釋東南亞國家對於中國基礎建設援助的不同態度,本文以國際因素與國內因素作為分析框架,討論何謂造成東南亞國家不同回應的原因。 在國際因素中,本文進一步細分成「安全穩定程度」、「依賴中國援助程度」兩子變項,而對國內因素的討論則限縮於「受援國內的社會抵抗」,以檢視東南亞國家在做出對中國經濟援助回應的決策上,受何者因素之作用/影響較強烈。 本文以柬埔寨、印尼作為比較個案,並假定「國際因素」為影響受援國回應中國經濟援助的關鍵變項,而國內的抵抗因素僅作為中介性變項。在類型化「安全穩定程度」、「依賴中國援助程度」後,本文著墨討論了何謂柬埔寨處於「安全穩定度低、依賴中國援助程度高」、印尼處於「安全穩定度高、依賴中國援助程度低」的相對位置。 兩國在安全、經濟援助結構差異下,我們觀察到柬埔寨對於中國援助的回應採強烈支持,而印尼則採具保留態度的支持、傾向經濟避險應對之。同時,兩國對於中國援助的回應,與他們在政治上的對外行為具相似性。亦即,我們從兩國對中國經濟誘因的回應,亦進一步討論了何謂柬埔寨在對外行為上傾向扈從中國,而印尼擅於採取避險方式應對多方強權。
As China's rising power manifests in its rapid economic growth, military expansion, and in its active promotion of bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation, China is increasingly adept at wielding a carrot-and-stick approach to create attractiveness and threats. In 2013, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive infrastructure project that would stretch from East Asia to Europe, to expand China's global economic reach and influence. In Southeast Asia, we observe that countries, by and large, hailed China’s economic inducements, albeit to a different extent. The article aims to investigate why Southeast Asian countries have differing responses to China’s infrastructure assistance. Based on the interface of domestic and international factors, the article contends that international factors are more significant to influence Southeast Asian countries’ external policies. On the contrary, we regard the domestically social resistance to China’s foreign assistance as an intervening variable, not a decisive factor to interpret countries’ varying attitudes toward China’s infrastructure assistance. Further, in this research, we characterize the international factors into two sets of security and economic relations with China and other great powers in the region, which play a major role in shaping Southeast Asian countries’ policy responses. We can categorize their responses into four quadrants in terms of a high or low degree of stability of security and reliance on China’s foreign assistance. Through the case studies of Cambodia and Indonesia, we hypothesize that the country (Cambodia) in the situation of low stability of security (China is not the main threat) and over-reliance on China’s aid, will bandwagon with China and be highly supportive of China’s infrastructure assistance; the country (Indonesia) in the situation of high stability of security and not over-reliance on China’s aid, will hedge against China and be supportive of China’s infrastructure assistance but with strong reservation.